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INTRODUCTION 
A few weeks prior to this Conference on Trust and Fiduciary Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, the Wall Street Journal published a front page news 
article with the headline Congress Staffers Gain from Trading in Stocks.1  The 
article reported that during the last two years, “[a]t least 72 aides on both sides 
of the aisle traded shares of companies that their bosses help oversee.”2  One 
congressional spokesman told the Journal that “[c]ongressional staff are often 
privy to inside information, and an unscrupulous person could profit off that 
knowledge.”3 
The article was, in many respects, a sequel to a Journal article published six 
years earlier with the headline U.S. Senators’ Stock Picks Outperform the 
Pros’.4  That article reported on an academic study finding that, during the 
1990s, the stock portfolios of U.S. Senators beat the market by an average of 
twelve percentage points.5  The study’s authors concluded that the “senators’ 
uncanny ability to know when to buy or sell their shares seems to stem from 
having access to information that other investors wouldn’t have.”6 
The Journal’s more recent article on congressional staffers, however, 
interspersed legal analysis with its factual reporting.  That is, the article 
acknowledged that “[t]he aides identified . . . say they didn’t profit by making 
trades based on any information gathered in the halls of Congress.”7  But the 
 
1 Brody Mullins et al., Congress Staffers Gain from Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
11, 2010, at A1. 
2 Id. (highlighting the Journal’s “analysis of more than 3,000 disclosure forms covering 
trading activity by Capitol Hill staffers for 2008 and 2009”). 
3 Id. (quoting Vincent Morris, spokesman for Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
4 Jane J. Kim, U.S. Senators’ Stock Picks Outperform the Pros’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 
2004, at D2. 
5 Id. (“The study’s authors, relying on financial-disclosure forms from 1993 to 1998, 
looked at about 6,000 common-stock transactions of about a third of the senators each 
year.”).  The cited study is Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common 
Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661 (2004). 
6 Kim, supra note 4 (“I don’t think you need much of an imagination to realize that 
they’re in the know.” (quoting Professor Ziobrowski, one of the study’s co-authors) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
7 Mullins et al., supra note 1. 
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Journal then advanced the claim that “[e]ven if they had done so, it would be 
legal, because insider-trading laws don’t apply to Congress.”8  The Journal 
published a follow-up article the next day highlighting the proposed STOCK 
Act, an acronym for the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act.9  That 
article noted that the proposed legislation, which had been pending in the U.S. 
House of Representatives for more than four years, sought to “outlaw insider 
trading by Capitol Hill members and their staffs.”10  Again, though, the 
Journal followed this fact with the legal conclusion that, in the absence of new 
legislation, “Congress is immune from insider-trading laws.”11 
The Journal’s conclusion about the legality of insider trading by members 
of Congress and legislative staffers set the blogosphere and mainstream media 
on fire.  Several securities law scholars agreed with the Journal’s analysis as it 
pertained to members of Congress, but disagreed that the conclusion also held 
true for legislative staffers.12  Then-Representative Brian Baird, the 
 
8 Id. 
9 Tom McGinty & Brody Mullins, Lawmaker Aims to Outlaw Insider Trading on the 
Hill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2010, at A9. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, More Evidence of Insider Trading Inside the 
Beltway, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Oct. 11, 2010, 7:32 AM), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/10/more-evidence-of-
insider-trading-inside-the-beltway.html (“The key point is that the staffers have no blanket 
immunity . . . in the way that members of Congress do.”); Thom Lambert, Does the Insider 
Trading Ban Apply to Congressional Staffers?, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Oct. 11, 2010, 6:22 
PM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/10/11/does-the-insider-trading-ban-apply-to-
congressional-staffers (“I think [the Journal article is] assuming that because members of 
Congress may trade on material, non-public information they learn in the course of their 
jobs, their aides may do so as well.  I don’t think that’s right.”).  Professor Bainbridge has 
analyzed the topic of congressional insider trading in an extensive article.  Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 285 (2011) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Beltway I] (“Congressional staffers and other government officials and 
employees could be prosecuted successfully for insider trading under the federal securities 
laws, but the quirks of the relevant laws almost certainly would prevent Members of 
Congress from being successfully prosecuted.”); see infra notes 171, 180, 186, 312. 
 Other securities and business law scholars have weighed in on these issues in the past.  
E.g., RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: HOW ETHICS 
REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 163 (2009) (contending that the current law governing 
insider trading “may not be sufficiently rigorous to prevent abuses by government 
officials”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant 
Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 107 (2009) (maintaining 
that while there is a plausible theory that would render insider trading by members of 
Congress illegal, a narrower view of the current law might be more likely to prevail); 
Ziobrowski et al., supra note 5, at 676 (“Current law does not prohibit Senators from trading 
stock on the basis of information acquired in the course of performing their normal 
Senatorial functions.”); see also sources cited infra note 237.  For student-written pieces, see 
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congressional co-author of the STOCK Act, drew no such distinction between 
members and staff, and opined that “[t]he public expects us to adhere to at least 
as high a standard as we impose on other people, and we don’t in this case.”13  
Former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt 
then entered the fray, lamenting in a broadcast that “members of Congress and 
their staffs . . . benefit from an exemption that the average investor doesn’t 
benefit from.  They’re immune from insider trading laws.”14  Media outlets 
were soon reporting as conventional wisdom that “while insider trading is 
illegal in the private sector, it is totally legal for government employees to do 
it” because “[b]asically, Congress passed a law making insider trading illegal 
for the private sector and exempted itself.”15 
 
Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. 
& SEC. L. 199, 215-17 (2009) (arguing that current law reaches neither members of 
Congress nor legislative staffers); Andrew George, Short Essay, Public (Self)-Service: 
Illegal Trading on Confidential Congressional Information, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 
163 (2008) (arguing that insider trading by members of Congress and legislative staffers is 
already illegal under the misappropriation theory); Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing In on 
Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political Intelligence for Profit, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1451, 1458-59 (2010) (arguing that insider trading by congressional officials is most 
likely not illegal under existing law, but advocating proposals for a change in the law 
governing congressional ethics rather than an amendment to the federal securities laws); 
Herbert T. Krimmel, Note, The Government Insider and Rule 10b-5: A New Application for 
an Expanding Doctrine, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1491, 1492 (1974) (arguing for a broad 
prohibition under the then-current law). 
13 McGinty & Mullins, supra note 9 (quoting Rep. Brian Baird (D-Wash.)). 
14 Arthur Levitt, Board Member at Bloomberg LP, Talks About the U.S. Financial 
Services System on Bloomberg Surveillance (Bloomberg radio broadcast Oct. 13, 2010) 
(transcript available through Analyst Wire, available at 2010 WLNR 20471195).  Former 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt considered it “a public outrage” that Congress has yet to adopt 
proposed legislation that would change the law.  Id.  In his view, the failure to adopt such 
legislation “condones insider trading” and is “a disgrace for Congress” that “looks terrible 
for them” because “working on serious legislation dealing with publicly owned companies” 
and then trading in the shares of those companies is “just a horrible, horrible practice.”  Id.  
Other former SEC officials have likewise expressed the view that current law does not 
prohibit insider trading by members of Congress.  See, e.g., Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to 
Ban Insider Trading by Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1 (“If 
a congressman learns that his committee is about to do something that would affect a 
company, he can go trade on that because he is not obligated to keep that information 
confidential . . . .  He is not breaching a duty of confidentiality to anybody and therefore he 
would not be liable for insider trading.” (quoting former Associate Director of the SEC 
Enforcement Division Thomas Newkirk)). 
15 Veronique de Rugy, If This Were the Private Sector, Those Congressional Staffers 
Would End Up in Jail, NAT. REV. ONLINE (Oct. 12, 2010, 5:16 PM), http://www.national 
review.com/corner/249553/if-were-private-sector-those-congressional-staffers-would-end-
jail-veronique-de-rugy.  For additional outrage, see, for example, Insider Trading on Capitol 
Hill?, THE WEEK (Oct. 13, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://theweek.com/ article/index/208085/ 
insider-trading-on-capitol-hill (“[T]he truly disgusting thing is that it is perfectly legal, since 
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Overlooked in all of the media hullabaloo about so-called “congressional 
immunity” from the insider trading laws were several critical facts.  First and 
foremost, Congress could not have “exempted itself” from its own insider 
trading laws because Congress has never enacted a federal securities law that 
explicitly prohibits anyone from insider trading.  In this respect, the United 
States stands in contrast with a host of other countries that explicitly prohibit 
certain persons from trading securities on the basis of material nonpublic 
information.16  The law in the United States is far more nuanced because, 
despite persistent calls for legislation and several abandoned attempts in the 
late 1980s,17 Congress has never statutorily defined the offense of insider 
trading in securities.18  Rather, Congress has been content to allow insider 
trading to be prosecuted as a violation of Rule 10b-5, a general antifraud rule 
which the SEC promulgated pursuant to its authority under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).19  Rule 10b-5 broadly 
prohibits fraud and deception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security,”20 and violations of the rule may be prosecuted by the SEC as a civil 
offense or prosecuted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) as a crime.21  Thus, 
 
insider-trading laws apply to business executives but not to members of Congress or their 
staffs.”); Ann Woolner, It Isn’t Insider Trading When Your Senator Does It, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 13, 2010, 9:15 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-
13/it-isn-t-insider-trading-when-your-senator-does-it-ann-woolner.html (“Congress should 
be ashamed of itself for not passing a law forbidding conduct that is criminal if anyone else 
does it.”). 
16 See Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading Regulation – A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT’L 
LAW. 153, 162 (2003). 
17 See infra notes 34, 36-38, and accompanying text. 
18 Although the federal securities laws do not explicitly prohibit insider trading, Congress 
has authorized the SEC to pursue stiff civil penalties against those who commit the offense.  
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2006) (authorizing the SEC 
to seek a monetary penalty of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided for 
violating the federal securities laws by trading securities while in possession of material 
nonpublic information).  Congress also addressed the topic of insider trading in section 
16(b) of the Exchange Act which requires certain corporate insiders to disgorge to the issuer 
so-called “short-swing” profits made from purchasing and selling an issuer’s equity 
securities within a six-month time frame.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  Although one of the 
purposes of this provision was to prevent the unfair use of confidential corporate 
information, the provision applies regardless of whether the corporate insider was aware of 
material nonpublic information at the time of the short-swing trade.  See id. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
20 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
21 Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes fines of not more than $5 million and/or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty years for willful violations of Exchange Act 
provisions and rules.  15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).  The DOJ may also pursue criminal prosecutions 
for insider trading under federal statutes prohibiting mail fraud or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1341, 1343 (2006), or under a relatively new federal statute prohibiting fraud in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities of public companies, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006) 
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with a single exception,22 insider trading is illegal under the federal securities 
laws only insofar as it can be deemed a fraudulent practice in violation of Rule 
10b-5.  The result is that U.S. insider trading law has been almost entirely 
judge-made, although much of that law has been subsequently codified in 
additional rules promulgated by the SEC.23 
The recent outcry over “congressional immunity” from insider trading law 
likewise ignores the essential body of judicial precedent that has developed 
over the decades.  Since 1980, when the Supreme Court decided Chiarella v. 
United States,24 insider trading has been viewed as a fraud on the parties to a 
securities transaction when those parties trade with a person who remains silent 
about material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary-like duty to 
disclose.  Pursuant to this “classical theory,” persons who owe duties of trust 
and confidence to an issuer’s shareholders must either disclose all material 
nonpublic information in their possession or abstain from trading in the 
issuer’s shares.25  The failure to “disclose or abstain”26 in such transactions 
constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5.27 
Moreover, since 1997, when it decided United States v. O’Hagan,28 the 
Court has recognized a second theory under which insider trading can be 
deemed a violation of Rule 10b-5.  Under the “misappropriation theory,” fraud 
occurs when a person owing a fiduciary-like duty to the source of material 
nonpublic information misappropriates that information by secretly using it to 
reap personal profits.29  The misappropriation theory of insider trading liability 
thus focuses on the relationship of trust and confidence that exists between the 
securities trader and the source of the material nonpublic information, and 
regards the source as the person who is defrauded in connection with the 
securities transaction.30 
 
(enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 807, 116 Stat. 
745, 804). 
22 When insider trading involves material nonpublic information pertaining to a tender 
offer, a special insider trading rule applies.  Once “a substantial step” toward a tender offer 
has been taken, Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading or tipping by any person in possession of 
material nonpublic information relating to that tender offer when that person knows or has 
reason to know that the information is nonpublic and was received from the offeror, the 
target, or any person acting on behalf of either the offeror or the target.  SEC Rule 14e-3, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2010). 
23 See infra note 139 and Part I.B (discussing Rule 10b5-1 and -2). 
24 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
25 Id. at 227. 
26 Id. 
27 See infra Part I.A.1. 
28 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
29 Id. at 652. 
30 See infra Part I.A.2. 
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Professor Tamar Frankel’s recent book31 and earlier writings on fiduciary 
law and duties of entrustment32 can help us to see precisely why insider trading 
by members of Congress and legislative staffers is already illegal under present 
law and why enactment of the proposed STOCK Act is not only unnecessary, 
but would also narrow considerably the present law that would apply to their 
securities transactions in the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition.  
Drawing from Professor Frankel’s extensive work, and from prior applications 
of fiduciary principles in congressional disciplinary actions and Executive 
Branch prosecutions of members of Congress for honest-services fraud, this 
Article argues that members of Congress and legislative staffers owe fiduciary-
like duties of trust and confidence to a host of persons including the citizen-
investors whom they serve, as well as the federal government, other members 
of Congress, and government officials outside of Congress who rely on their 
loyalty and integrity.33  Based on these duties of entrustment, this Article 
concludes that congressional officials engage in deception, and therefore 
violate Rule 10b-5, if they trade securities on the basis of material nonpublic 
information obtained through congressional service. 
A new statute explicitly prohibiting the offense of insider trading would be a 
very welcome development under the federal securities laws.34  But almost all 
instances of real or hypothesized congressional insider trading can fit squarely 
within either the classical or misappropriation theory paradigms under Rule 
10b-5.  Given that it has the authority to investigate all instances of possible 
insider trading in securities, the SEC should be doing more to refute the 
mistaken view that there is some type of congressional exemption.  Indeed, 
education, rather than prosecution, may be the SEC’s most effective 
enforcement tool.  Any legislative change should clarify insider trading law for 
everyone, and until that time, the current law – with its emphasis on duties of 
entrustment – works as well for congressional officials as it does for every 
other person who trades securities in our capital markets. 
 
31 TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011). 
32 See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD (2006); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983). 
33 See infra Part III.A. 
34 See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading 
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 183 (1991) (observing that the federal prohibition of insider 
trading “has been developed within the framework of federal securities fraud” and 
concluding that “the resulting case law contains logical as well as interpretive flaws”); 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material 
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 883, 889 (2010) (contending that “[t]he 
absence of a clear definition of insider trading under federal securities law has led to 
hundreds of decisions grappling with the issue” and that, without new legislation, “courts 
will continue to muddle through the tortuous path of Rule 10b-5 liability for insider 
trading”). 
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I. INSIDER TRADING AS A VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 
Almost twenty-five years ago, in the wake of Wall Street scandals involving 
Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, among many others,35 Congress responded 
to calls for an explicit statutory prohibition of insider trading and considered 
several specific proposals.36  The Insider Trading Proscription Act of 1987, for 
example, would have amended the Exchange Act to prohibit the use of 
material nonpublic information to purchase or sell any security if a “person 
knows or recklessly disregards that such information has been obtained 
wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of 
such information.”37  Congress, however, ultimately decided against any 
explicit statutory prohibition because, in its view, “the court-drawn parameters 
of insider trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of 
traditional insider trading cases, and . . . a statutory definition could potentially 
be narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the 
law.”38 
The “court-drawn parameters of insider trading” that operate today have not 
changed much from those that engendered congressional confidence in the 
1980s, nor has the SEC’s resolve to combat illegal insider trading diminished.  
Today, as in the 1980s, insider trading is usually prosecuted as a violation of 
Rule 10b-5 under either the classical or misappropriation theory.39  To the 
extent that insider trading law has evolved, it has done so largely to expand 
 
35 See Daniel Hertzberg, The Informant: How a Bookkeeper for Boesky Helped Bring 
Down Milken, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 11, 1990, at A1 (recalling the government prosecution of 
Boesky, Milken, and Drexel Burnham). 
36 See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States 
v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 200-02 (1998) (discussing the testimony and debates 
leading up to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 
Stat. 1264, and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
(ITSFEA), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677); id. at 218-28 (analyzing statutory 
proposals suggested by the ABA’s Task Force on the Regulation of Insider Trading as well 
as by a host of securities law scholars). 
37 The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987), reprinted 
in SEC Compromise Proposal on Insider Trading Legislation; Accompanying Letter, and 
Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 
1987).  The statutory definition of “wrongful” extended to information that: 
has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft, 
bribery misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or other means) or (B) 
conversion, misappropriation, or any other breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any contractual or 
employment relationship. 
Id. 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048. 
39 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (“The two theories are 
complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the 
purchase or sale of securities.”). 
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these paradigms to encompass cases where material nonpublic information has 
been acquired or used improperly, even in instances where the trader or tipper 
had not been entrusted with information.40  Moreover, as in the 1980s, the SEC 
continues to place a high priority on insider trading investigations and 
prosecutions.  From 2001 through 2006, for example, the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement initiated more than 300 actions against more than 600 individuals 
and entities for alleged insider trading.41  Over that five-year time period, 
insider trading cases made up about seven to twelve percent of the SEC’s filed 
caseload.42 
This Part of the Article is divided into three Sections.  Section A recounts 
the judicial development of the classical and misappropriation theories of 
insider trading and, in so doing, highlights key cases involving persons 
(including several government officials) who were found liable for violating 
Rule 10b-5 because of their trading in securities based on material nonpublic 
information entrusted to them.  Section B briefly examines an SEC rule which 
delineates specific circumstances giving rise to a “duty of trust or confidence” 
for purposes of the misappropriation theory.  Section C discusses other 
obstacles frequently encountered by the government in prosecuting insider 
trading as a violation of Rule 10b-5.43 
A. The Judicial Development of Insider Trading Law 
1. The Classical Theory 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chiarella v. United 
States,44 lower courts and the SEC advocated an expansive view of Rule 10b-5 
liability that required “anyone in possession of material inside information [to] 
 
40 For recent cases recognizing Rule 10b-5 liability for insider trading notwithstanding 
the absence of a fiduciary-like relationship between the trader and the issuer or the source of 
the information, see SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a 
computer hacker would be liable for insider trading under Rule 10b-5 if he obtained material 
nonpublic information through deceptive means); SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 
(N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a defendant in an arm’s-length business relationship with 
securities issuer could be liable for insider trading under Rule 10b-5 if he traded securities in 
breach of a promise not to use issuer’s material nonpublic information in a securities 
transaction), vacated on other grounds, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).  For scholarly 
critiques of these decisions, see sources cited infra note 96. 
41 Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate 
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 
(2006) [hereinafter Hearings on Insider Trading] (testimony of Linda Thomsen, Director, 
SEC Division of Enforcement). 
42 Id. 
43 Much of the background in Part I is based on the more extensive discussion in RALPH 
C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE 
WALL §§ 2.01[1]-[3], 2.02[3], 2.02[6] (2010). 
44 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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either disclose it to the investing public, or . . . abstain from trading in or 
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains 
undisclosed.”45  The majority in Chiarella found this “parity of information” 
rule too broad because it contradicted the common law doctrine that a person’s 
mere silence about material facts in a business transaction was not fraudulent 
in the absence of a duty to disclose.46  In the Court’s view, a duty to disclose 
material facts “arises when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is 
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence between them.’”47  Accordingly, under Chiarella’s classical theory, 
a corporate insider’s silence about material nonpublic information in a 
securities transaction violates Rule 10b-5 because “a relationship of trust and 
confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those 
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position 
with that corporation.”48 
Three years after deciding Chiarella, the Court made considerable use of 
legal fictions to expand its classical theory beyond traditional insiders (namely, 
an issuer’s officers, directors, and employees) whose silence about material 
facts in securities transactions may have been (at least arguably) regarded as 
fraudulent under the common law.49  In Dirks v. SEC,50 the Court observed that 
Rule 10b-5’s obligation to disclose or abstain extended as well to temporary 
agents or “constructive insiders” of the securities issuer, such as lawyers, 
accountants or consultants, who “become fiduciaries” of the corporation’s 
shareholders because “they have entered into a special confidential relationship 
in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes.”51  The Dirks Court further 
extended the classical theory to trading by so-called tippees of insiders who 
convey the securities issuer’s confidential information in exchange for a 
personal benefit.52  As the Court explained, “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty 
to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic 
information . . . when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the 
 
45 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
46 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to 
the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.”). 
47 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977)). 
48 Id. 
49 But see A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s 
Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 26 (1998) (contending that from 
a doctrinal perspective, the Chiarella Court’s invocation of the common law of deceit “is 
strained” because common law fraud required a showing of reliance (which would be 
impossible to show in open-market transactions on a stock exchange) and would not have 
recognized a fiduciary duty owed to prospective shareholders). 
50 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
51 Id. at 655 n.14 (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 659-60. 
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shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows 
or should know that there has been a breach.”53  Thus, even though 
constructive insiders and tippees stand as strangers to the issuer’s shareholders, 
like traditional insiders, their Rule 10b-5 liability “is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a 
transaction.”54 
Although the Court undoubtedly had in mind traditional insiders and 
temporary agents of the securities issuer (and their tippees) when it framed its 
classical theory of insider trading liability,55 its holdings in Chiarella and Dirks 
should apply in the context of any fiduciary or other “special relationship” 
between a securities trader and the issuer’s shareholders.56  Indeed, traditional 
insiders, constructive insiders, and tippees are hardly the only persons whose 
“silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a 
fraud actionable under § 10(b).”57  In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,58 
for instance, the Court held that two assistant bank managers, who had 
assumed a fiduciary-like duty to act on behalf of selling stockholders, violated 
Rule 10b-5 when they purchased stock from those sellers while remaining 
silent about material facts pertaining to the existence of a secondary market 
that had priced the stock substantially higher.59  Moreover, courts, including 
 
53 Id. at 660 (emphasis added).  Dirks’s discussion of tipper-tippee liability is discussed 
more extensively infra Part III.D. 
54 United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980); see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (“We 
reaffirm today that ‘[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties . . . 
and not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his position in the 
market.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.14)). 
55 See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 5:2.1 (2d ed. 
2008) (depicting a Chiarella/Dirks “classical special relationship triangle”). 
56 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority had 
predicated insider trading liability on a “special relationship akin to fiduciary duty” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15 (holding that the mere 
receipt of nonpublic information from an insider does not create a “special relationship” 
between the tippee and the issuer’s shareholders); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 
(emphasizing that petitioner did not owe securities sellers a disclosure duty because: “He 
was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence.  He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the 
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.”). 
57 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
58 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
59 Id. at 153 (“The individual defendants, in a distinct sense, were market makers . . . .  
This being so, they possessed the affirmative duty under . . . Rule [10b-5] to disclose this 
fact to the . . . sellers.”).  In support of this holding, the Affiliated Ute Court cited Chasins v. 
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).  Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.  The 
Second Circuit had held in Chasins that a broker-dealer’s “failure to inform the customer 
fully of its possible conflict of interest, in that it was a market maker in the securities which 
it strongly recommended for purchase by him, was an omission of material fact in violation 
of Rule 10b-5.”  Chasins, 438 F.2d at 1172. 
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the Supreme Court, have held that anti-fraud provisions in the federal 
securities law prohibit “scalping” – that is, recommending the purchase of a 
security without disclosing personal ownership of that same security – in 
circumstances in which the recommender owes duties of trust and confidence 
to the recipients of the recommendation.60  Thus, in the specific context of 
securities traded on the basis of material nonpublic information, Chiarella and 
Dirks affirmed a more general doctrine that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever a 
person remains silent about material facts in breach of a fiduciary-like 
disclosure duty owed to the persons with whom he trades.61  This general 
doctrine should apply when congressional officials and other public fiduciaries 
trade securities on the basis of nonpublic government information.62 
2. The Misappropriation Theory 
After years of acceptance by many federal courts and the SEC, the Supreme 
Court gave the misappropriation theory of insider trading its ringing 
endorsement in United States v. O’Hagan.63  As the Court explained, the 
 
60 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181, 201 (1963) (holding 
that registered investment advisers engage in fraud and deceit under section 206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act when they recommend securities to clients without disclosing to 
them that the adviser also owned the recommended securities); see also Zweig v. Hearst 
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[O]rdinarily [columnists] have no duty to 
disclose facts about their personal financial affairs . . . .  [but] the defendant assumed those 
duties when, with knowledge of the stock’s market and an intent to gain personally, he 
encouraged purchases of the securities in the market.”); SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 
900 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that an internet guru who operated a stock-picking and 
investment advice website owed fee-paying subscribers a duty of trust and confidence that 
could render his silence about his intention to sell a fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5).  
Although the Ninth Circuit decided Zweig prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chiarella, the SEC insists that its precedent is still valid because the columnist’s Rule 10b-5 
disclosure obligation had been predicated on his relationship of trust and confidence with 
his readers.  Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (considering the SEC’s argument and concluding 
that “Zweig still seems to be good law”).  
61 In fact, the Chiarella Court cited Affiliated Ute as authority for its classical theory of 
insider trading.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229; cf. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 11 
(2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Supreme Court has extended the ‘duty of disclosure’ requirement to 
nontraditional ‘insiders’ – persons who have no special access to corporate information but 
who do have a special relationship of ‘trust’ and ‘confidentiality’ with the issuer or seller of 
the securities.” (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. 128; Capital Gains, 375 U.S. 180)). 
62 See infra Part III.A.1.b. 
63 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997).  Prior to the Court’s decision in O’Hagan, the validity of 
the misappropriation theory had been accepted by the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits.  See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 
F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).  The theory had been rejected by 
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995), and by the 
Eighth Circuit in United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 
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misappropriation theory extends Rule 10b-5 to outsiders who lack fiduciary 
connections with an issuer’s shareholders, but who owe fiduciary-like duties to 
the source of the material nonpublic information used in the securities 
transaction.  Accordingly, the misappropriation theory is premised “on a 
fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to 
confidential information.”64 
Based on the statutory text of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court 
in O’Hagan had little trouble affirming the jury’s verdict that the defendant, 
who had been a partner in a national law firm, had violated Rule 10b-5 by 
secretly trading the securities of an acquisition target based on material 
nonpublic information that he had learned from his law firm and its client, 
which had been planning the hostile acquisition.65  In the Court’s view, “a 
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to 
purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,” 
satisfies Rule 10b-5’s deception requirement because such trading “defrauds 
the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”66  The Court observed 
that misappropriators “deal in deception.  A fiduciary who [pretends] loyalty to 
the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal 
gain dupes or defrauds the principal.”67  The Court also found that this 
deception satisfies Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement because “the 
fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential 
information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the 
information to purchase or sell securities.”68  However, “[b]ecause the 
deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to 
the source of the information,” the Court acknowledged that there would be no 
liability under Rule 10b-5 “if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans 
to trade on the nonpublic information.”69 
Although the O’Hagan Court based its holding on the text of the statute, the 
Court also grounded the misappropriation theory in the “congressional 
purposes underlying § 10(b).”70  As the Court candidly acknowledged, the 
theory is “well tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to ensure 
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”71  Here 
 
U.S. 642 (1997). 
64 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
65 Id. at 647-48. 
66 Id. at 652. 
67 Id. at 653-54 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 Id. at 655-56. 
69 Id. at 655.  Here the Court emphasized two additional points: first, despite disclosure, a 
“fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty;” 
and second, when a person owes a fiduciary-like duty to two entities, disclosure to one but 
not the other would not absolve misappropriation theory liability.  Id. at 655 & n.7. 
70 Id. at 659. 
71 Id. at 658. 
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the Court observed that while “informational disparity is inevitable in the 
securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a 
market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is 
unchecked by law.”72  The SEC and Congress have also advanced these same 
policy arguments to justify rigorous federal regulation of insider trading.73  
Market integrity and investor confidence-based rationales have, however, 
generated a spirited debate among securities law scholars that has lasted for 
decades.74 
The Court in O’Hagan emphasized that the misappropriation theory “is 
limited to those who breach a recognized duty.”75  But O’Hagan’s particular 
facts may have caused it to skimp a bit in describing the precise contours of the 
relationship that triggers the disclosure obligation essential to the theory.  The 
defendant in O’Hagan was an attorney who clearly stood in a fiduciary 
relationship with both his law firm and its client.76  Accordingly, the Court 
simply assumed that the defendant-attorney owed both his firm and its client a 
fiduciary duty that was breached when he used their information in securities 
trading without first informing them of his intention to do so. 
Yet the Court in O’Hagan never implied – let alone stated – that a 
relationship had to be strictly a “fiduciary” one for a disclosure duty to attach 
under the misappropriation theory.  Rather, reflecting the practice of lower 
courts applying the misappropriation theory,77 the Court used the term 
“fiduciary duty” interchangeably with a “duty of trust and confidence.”78  This 
 
72 Id. 
73 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259 
[1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,859 (proposed Dec. 
20, 1999) [hereinafter SEC Proposing Release] (“We have long recognized that the 
fundamental unfairness of insider trading harms not only individual investors, but also the 
very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence in the integrity of the 
markets.”); infra note 192 and accompanying text (quoting congressional statement that 
insider trading by temporary or constructive insiders “undermines confidence in the markets 
in the same manner as trading by corporate insiders”). 
74 For an extensive review of the vast scholarly literature on the detriments and benefits 
of insider trading, see 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION §§ 1:2-1:6 (2010), and WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 55, 
§§ 2:1-2:4.  A “protection of property rights” rationale for the federal insider trading 
prohibition is discussed infra note 284. 
75 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666. 
76 Id. at 653 (discussing defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty to his law firm and its 
client). 
77 See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 447 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The common-sense notion 
underlying the misappropriation theory is that one who misappropriates valuable 
information for his own benefit, in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and 
confidence, has surely committed fraud on the person or entity to whom that duty is 
owed.”). 
78 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (“[T]he indictment alleged that O’Hagan [traded 
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more flexible phraseology is consistent with the Court’s insistence in Chiarella 
that common law disclosure duties were predicated on “a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence.”79  The O’Hagan Court’s citation to 
the obligations reflected in sections 390 and 395 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency serves as further evidence that the Court envisioned “the recognized 
duty” as a broad one.80 
Both before and after O’Hagan, the SEC and most lower courts have been 
inclined to view the disclosure obligation at the heart of the misappropriation 
theory quite expansively.  To be sure, the overwhelming number of decisions 
and settlements imposing Rule 10b-5 liability under the misappropriation 
theory involve relationships that are quintessentially fiduciary or their 
“functional equivalent,”81 such as employer-employee,82 principal-agent,83 
 
Pillsbury stock] in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm . . . and 
to its client.”). 
79 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
80 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1958) 
(“[An agent has] a duty to deal fairly with the principal and to disclose to him all facts 
which the agent knows or should know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment.”); 
id. § 395 (“[A]n agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate 
information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course 
of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to 
the injury at the principal.”); Pritchard, supra note 49, at 15 (contending that the Court in 
O’Hagan “breaks new ground in establishing a foundation for insider trading based on 
common law agency principles”). 
81 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(observing that “the common law has recognized that some associations are inherently 
fiduciary” including such “hornbook fiduciary relations [as] those existing between attorney 
and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and trust 
beneficiary, and senior corporate official and shareholder” and concluding that disclosure 
duties also apply to their “function equivalent[s]”).  The court in Chestman also observed 
that all of the Rule 10b-5 circuit precedents under the misappropriation theory at that time 
“involved egregious fiduciary breaches arising solely in the context of employer/employee 
associations.”  Id. at 567. 
82 See, e.g., Clark, 915 F.2d at 453 (“[A]n employee’s knowing misappropriation and use 
of his employer’s material nonpublic information regarding its intention to acquire another 
firm constitutes a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); Carpenter v. United States, 791 
F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a reporter defrauded his Wall Street Journal-
employer and violated Rule 10b-5 when he tipped stockbroker friends as to the contents of 
upcoming financial columns), aff’d by a divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (4-4 decision); 
SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that law firm’s office 
services manager breached duty to law firm and law firm’s clients by tipping material 
nonpublic information he learned during employment), aff’d, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990). 
83 See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding an employee of a 
financial printer liable under Rule 10b-5 for tipping information the printing company had 
acquired in confidence from its clients); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 
1981) (holding that employees at two investment banks violated Rule 10b-5 when they 
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attorney-client,84 and doctor-patient.85  But insider trading cases prosecuted 
under the misappropriation theory sometimes fall outside of these well-
recognized categories and courts must then engage in ad hoc inquiries to 
determine whether the trader (or tipper) and the source of the information stand 
in a relationship of trust and confidence that renders the failure to disclose the 
use of material nonpublic information a fraud on the source in violation of 
Rule 10b-5. 
In determining whether a professional, social, or familial relationship is one 
of trust and confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory, courts 
generally look to the “reasonable and legitimate” expectations of the parties 
and question whether those parties had “a history or practice of sharing 
business confidences, [and whether] those confidences were generally 
maintained.”86  More controversially, courts have also recognized a 
relationship of trust and confidence when the trader or tipper has “expressly 
agreed” to keep the source’s information confidential.87  Based on such ad hoc 
inquiries, Rule 10b-5 liability has been imposed in cases involving: family 
members who traded on (or tipped) information misappropriated from their 
spouses and relatives;88 participants in private placements who traded 
 
tipped material nonpublic information that had been entrusted to their employer by clients of 
the banks). 
84 See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653; United States v. Grossman 843 F.2d 78, 84 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (affirming conviction under Rule 10b-5 where associate at law firm both traded 
on the basis of confidential client information and tipped relatives who subsequently 
traded). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying 
psychiatrist’s motion to dismiss insider trading indictment because “[t]he relationship 
between a psychiatrist and patient has all the characteristics of what the [Second Circuit] 
calls a ‘paradigmatic fiduciary relationship’” (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569)). 
86 SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2003). 
87 See, e.g., SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding that the 
SEC’s allegation that tipper had “expressly agreed to maintain the confidentiality of . . . 
information is sufficient to state a claim that he had a similar relationship of trust and 
confidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to dismiss charges of insider trading because the SEC alleged 
specific facts evidencing that defendant had expressly agreed to keep information 
confidential).  For contrary conclusions reached by courts and commentators, see infra notes 
114, 121-128 and accompanying text. 
88 See SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that the SEC could show 
that wife deceived husband when she allowed him to share business confidences without 
informing him of a pre-existing agreement with her brother to share any significant 
information about the husband’s company); Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273-74 (“[T]he SEC provided 
sufficient evidence both that an agreement of confidentiality and a history or pattern of 
sharing and keeping of business confidences existed between [husband and wife].”); United 
States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that government may prove 
at trial “that Reed and his father were bound by an agreement or understanding of 
confidentiality, express or implied, or that some regular pattern of behavior by defendant 
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securities in the public markets based on the confidential information to which 
they were given access;89 an electrician who traded on information that he 
overheard while at a company repairing its wiring;90 a member of a business 
roundtable who traded on information conveyed by a fellow member;91 a 
businessman who traded on information entrusted to him by his business 
partner;92 a bank that traded corporate bonds based on nonpublic information 
obtained through service on six bankruptcy creditors’ committees;93 a juror 
who tipped confidential information obtained from his service on a grand 
jury;94 and a government affairs consultant who tipped information that had 
been subject to a news embargo by the Treasury Department.95  To be sure, 
several securities law scholars (including this Author) have criticized some of 
these precedents for stretching too far the relationship of trust and confidence 
parameters that were drawn by the Court in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.96  
 
and his father generated on the part of those two men a justifiable expectation of 
confidentiality and fidelity”), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 74, § 11:8 n.14 (citing SEC settlements in “gray areas” of liability 
such as those involving alleged insider trading by in-laws and a live-in non-marital partner).  
But see infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. 
89 See Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (concluding that the SEC’s complaint “plausibly 
support[s] its claim that a confidential relationship arose between defendants and those four 
PIPE issuers”); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 43, § 2.08[4] (discussing SEC settlements 
imposing Rule 10b-5 liability in the context of PIPE (private investment in public equity) 
transactions).  But see infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
90 SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 522-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that although he 
was not a traditional fiduciary, an electrical contractor nonetheless was placed “in a position 
of trust and confidence” that he violated when he “used for personal benefit information 
obtained during the course of his association”). 
91 SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (concluding that roundtable 
members had an express, unwritten policy of keeping shared information confidential and 
thus owed a duty of trust and confidence to each other).  But see infra note 114. 
92 SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505, 1521 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that the “partnership 
expected that all business matters of each partner would be held in trust and confidence”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1992). 
93 Barclays Bank PLC, Litigation Release No. 20132, 90 SEC Docket 1999 (May 30, 
2007) (announcing settlement whereby defendant agreed to pay $10.9 million to settle 
charges of insider trading). 
94 See John Herzfeld, Crime: Grand Juror Sentenced to Prison for Leaks to Insider 
Trading Ring, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2098 (Dec. 18, 2006) (reporting 
that a former postal worker, who had been serving on a grand jury investigating Bristol-
Myers, pleaded guilty to conspiracy, insider trading, and criminal contempt for tipping 
information about that probe to two former employees of Goldman Sachs). 
95 Davis, Litigation Release No. 18322 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18322.htm (announcing guilty plea and civil settlement with the 
SEC); see also SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 173 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying 
summary judgment motion brought by one of the consultant’s tippees). 
96 See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 
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But the fact remains that the SEC and the DOJ have been consistent, and for 
the most part successful, in advancing a strikingly broad view as to what it 
means to be entrusted with material nonpublic information for purposes of the 
Rule 10b-5 insider trading prohibition. 
Misappropriation theory cases involving “hornbook fiduciary relations”97 
such as employment, including government employment, typically do not 
involve the same ad hoc focus on the source’s “reasonable and legitimate” 
expectations of confidentiality that is the norm in cases involving family 
members, businesspersons, and the like.  Instead, as with other employer-
employee cases,98 in insider trading prosecutions brought against government 
officials, courts simply assume without question that those officials breached 
fiduciary duties when they used material nonpublic information obtained 
through government service for securities trading purposes, or when they 
tipped others who used that information to trade.99  Notable Rule 10b-5 
prosecutions have involved securities trading or tipping by federal officials at 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),100 the Federal Reserve,101 the 
 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1363-64 (2009) (arguing that several recent cases and SEC 
settlements reflect an evolving view that the offense of insider trading involves the wrongful 
use of material nonpublic information regardless of whether the trader or tipper breaches a 
fiduciary-like duty owed to the issuer’s shareholders or the source of the information); see 
also Amended Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, 
SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3:08-cv-02050), 2009 WL 
1257407 [hereinafter Amended Brief of Amici Curiae] (submitted by Professors Allen 
Ferrell, Stephen Bainbridge, Alan R. Bromberg, M. Todd Henderson, and Jonathan R. 
Macey, arguing that “[u]nder both state and federal common law, a confidentiality 
agreement alone creates only an obligation to maintain the secrecy of the information, not a 
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty to act loyally to the source of the information”); STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 83 n.33 (2d ed. 2007) (criticizing the 
results-oriented nature of the “trust and confidence” phraseology because “[i]f a court 
wishes to impose liability, it need simply conclude that the relationship in question involves 
trust and confidence, even though the relationship bears no resemblance to those in which 
fiduciary-like duties are normally imposed”). 
97 See SEC v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
98 See sources cited in supra note 82. 
99 Many federal agencies and executive departments also operate under specific statutes 
and rules prohibiting officials from using and/or disseminating nonpublic government 
information for nongovernmental purposes.  See PAINTER, supra note 12, at 63-65 
(discussing the U.S. Department of the Treasury and observing that “Congress, for over 200 
years, has been adding piecemeal statutory provisions in response to conflicts of interest in 
particular agencies”). 
100 United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming former FBI 
special agent’s Rule 10b-5 conviction and six year prison sentence for tipping others who 
traded securities based on material nonpublic information obtained from law enforcement 
databases). 
101 See Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037, 1039 (1969) (holding brokerage firm employees 
liable under Rule 10b-5 for trading on material nonpublic information about an upcoming 
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Department of the Navy,102 and the Comptroller of the Currency.103  State 
officials have also been prosecuted under Rule 10b-5 for trading securities on 
the basis of nonpublic information obtained through government service.104  
Other decisions have held government officials or their tippees liable for 
defrauding the government when entrusted information was misappropriated 
for personal profit in the securities market,105 the commodities market,106 or in 
 
issuance of government securities that had been tipped to them by a manager of the Bond 
and Custody Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia); Shift by U.S. in 
Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, at D12 (reporting that Robert Rough, a former 
director of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, admitted that he regularly disclosed 
nonpublic information about the Fed’s discount rate to a securities brokerage firm, and that 
in exchange for Rough’s plea to one count of bank fraud, “the Government agreed to drop 
six other counts, including insider trading and . . . agreed to recommend a prison sentence of 
less than a year.”); see also Fed Ex-Official Gets 6 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1989, at 
D7 (reporting Rough’s sentence of six months in prison and 200 hours of community 
service during two years of probation). 
102 Saunders, Litigation Release No. 9744, 26 SEC Docket 75 (Sept. 2, 1992) 
(announcing guilty plea and the settlement of civil charges in Rule 10b-5 case against 
civilian employed by Navy who had purchased shares in a company that was about to be 
awarded a government contract); Mills, Litigation Release No. 11877, 41 SEC Docket 1257 
(Sept. 28, 1988) (discussing an independent consultant hired by the Navy who settled Rule 
10b-5 charges that he purchased shares of a company based on the material nonpublic 
information that the company’s bid for a Navy contract was favored over its competitor’s 
bid). 
103 Acree, Litigation Release No. 14231, 57 SEC Docket 1579 (Sept. 13, 1994) 
(discussing a former employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency who settled 
Rule 10b-5 charges that he traded in securities of several bank holding companies while in 
possession of material nonpublic information which he misappropriated from the OCC). 
104 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing Rule 10b-5 
conviction of the former Director of the state-owned West Virginia Lottery who had used 
material nonpublic information to purchase securities in issuers about to be awarded 
government contracts, but affirming the Director’s conviction under the federal wire fraud 
statute for the same conduct).  The Fourth Circuit’s finding that Rule 10b-5 liability could 
not be premised on the misappropriation theory was itself overturned with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).  For additional discussion of the 
Fourth Circuit’s wire fraud holding in Bryan, see infra notes 277-280 and accompanying 
text.  For a related prosecution of a second defendant, see United States v. ReBrook, 842 F. 
Supp. 891, 892 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (affirming jury verdict finding violations of Rule 10b-5 
and the federal wire fraud statute by an attorney with the state-owned West Virginia Lottery 
who had used material nonpublic information to purchase securities in issuers who were 
about to be awarded government contracts), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 58 F.3d 961, 963 
(4th Cir. 1995) (affirming wire fraud ruling but reversing Rule 10b-5 ruling that had been 
premised on the misappropriation theory). 
105 United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming defendant’s 
conviction for “conspir[ing] with others, including an employee of the SEC, to obtain 
confidential inside information about matters under consideration by the Commission and 
use such information for private profit”).  For a fascinating discussion of a dismissed 
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real estate transactions.107  Accordingly, at least at first blush, insider trading 
by members of Congress and legislative staffers would seem to fit squarely 
within these other government official precedents.108 
B. SEC Rule 10b5-2 
As the foregoing has explained, when confronted with non-traditional 
fiduciary relationships, the SEC and most lower courts have taken an 
expansive view of the circumstances under which a securities trader (or tipper) 
and the source of material nonpublic information can be said to be in a 
relationship of trust and confidence for purposes of the misappropriation 
theory.  The Second Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Chestman109 
constitutes a notable exception.  The Chestman court reversed the defendant’s 
conviction under Rule 10b-5 because, in the court’s view, the government did 
not sustain its burden of proving a sufficient fiduciary-like relationship 
between the tipper and the source of the information.110  Although the tipper 
was married to the source, and the information was imparted in confidence, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that “marriage does not, without more, create a 
fiduciary relationship”111 and that “a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed 
 
conspiracy prosecution against a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Joseph McKenna for 
allegedly tipping others who traded securities based on information pertaining to an 
unreleased decision, see John B. Owens, The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker: Ashton 
Embry and the Supreme Court Leak Scandal of 1919, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2000).  
As Owens explains it, the prosecution was dismissed even though an indictment against the 
law clerk had been upheld by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and a writ of 
certiorari had been denied by the Supreme Court.  See id. at 297-98 (citing Embry v. United 
States, 257 U.S. 655 (1921)).  Owens maintains that the DOJ’s official files “remain eerily 
quiet on the subject, containing no notes or memoranda explaining why the U.S. Attorney 
dismissed the case.”  Id. at 297. 
106 Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 472 (1910); Peckham v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 483, 484 
(1910); Price v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 488, 494 (1910).  The Haas Court observed that the 
conspiracy was to obtain crop reports from a statistician in the Department of Agriculture 
in advance of general publicity and to use such information in speculating upon the 
cotton market, and thereby defraud the United States by defeating, obstructing and 
impairing it in the exercise of its governmental function in the regular and official duty 
of publicly promulgating fair, impartial and accurate reports concerning the cotton 
crop. 
Haas, 216 U.S. at 478. 
107 United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 561 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming conviction of 
city councilman under conspiracy and mail fraud statutes for conduct including the purchase 
of tax delinquent properties based on nonpublic information). 
108 See infra Part III.A.2.a. 
109 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
110 Id. at 554. 
111 Id. at 568.  The court reasoned that “[a] similar relationship of trust and confidence . . 
. must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential information.”112  Rather, 
as the Second Circuit saw it: 
A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency: 
One person depends on another – the fiduciary – to serve his interests.  In 
relying on a fiduciary to act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the relation 
may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property of one sort or 
another.  Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property to serve the 
ends of the fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to 
appropriate the property for his own use. . . .  These characteristics 
represent the measure of the paradigmatic fiduciary relationship.  A 
similar relationship of trust and confidence consequently must share these 
qualities.113 
Other courts have emphasized the Chestman court’s characterization of a 
fiduciary114 as one who acts for “the benefit of another person, as to whom he 
stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on 
the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part.”115 
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 in direct response to what it viewed as 
Chestman’s unduly narrow parameters116 and its failure to “sufficiently protect 
investors and the securities markets from the misappropriation and resulting 
misuse of inside information.”117  The rule bears the caption, “Duties of trust or 
 
112 Id. at 567. 
113 Id. at 569. 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[Fiduciary] 
relationships are marked by the fact that the party in whom confidence is reposed has 
entered into a relationship in which he or she acts to serve the interests of the party 
entrusting him or her with such information.” (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568-69)).  For 
cases citing Chestman as a reason for declining to find a fiduciary-like relationship for 
purposes of the misappropriation theory, see United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 
485 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasizing that the business competitors were “not inherent 
fiduciaries, but rather potential arms-length business partners . . . [who] did not have a long-
standing relationship or . . . regularly shared confidences,” and concluding that “[t]his is 
very far from a relationship marked by ‘de facto control’ and ‘dominance’ or entailing 
‘discretionary authority and dependency’” (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568-69)), and 
United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a 
member of the Young Presidents Association, a national organization of company presidents 
under the age of fifty, did not owe a duty of trust or confidence to fellow club member, 
notwithstanding the club’s written requirement that all members must comply with a 
confidentiality agreement). 
115 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568-69. 
116 See SEC Proposing Release, supra note 73, at 82,863 (“[T]he Chestman majority’s 
approach does not fully recognize the degree to which parties to close family and personal 
relationships have reasonable and legitimate expectations of confidentiality in their 
communications.”). 
117 See id. 
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confidence in misappropriation insider trading cases,”118 and as its preliminary 
note explains that the rule provides a non-exclusive list of three situations in 
which a person has “a duty of trust or confidence” for purposes of the 
misappropriation theory.119  The three situations enumerated in Rule 10b5-2(b) 
include: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain [that] information in 
confidence; 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic 
information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, 
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences such that the recipient of the 
information knows or reasonably should know that the person 
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the 
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or 
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information 
from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that 
the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that 
no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by 
establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have 
known that the person who was the source of the information expected 
that the person would keep the information confidential . . . .120 
Accordingly, had Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) been in place at the time of the Chestman 
defendant’s alleged violations, it may have changed the result. 
But it is the first subsection of Rule 10b5-2(b) that has received the bulk of 
attention from commentators and courts.  Several securities law scholars (this 
Author among them) have questioned whether the SEC can expand the 
misappropriation theory to encompass the mere breach of a confidentiality 
agreement notwithstanding the absence of a fiduciary or similar relationship of 
trust and confidence between the trader and the information’s source.121  
Agreements to maintain the confidentiality of information may be entered into 
by persons owing duties of trust and confidence to the source (and may thus 
confirm a duty otherwise inherent in that relationship).  But confidentiality 
 
118 SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2010). 
119 Id. at Preliminary Note. 
120 Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)-(3). 
121 See Nagy, supra note 96, at 1357-64 (questioning the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) 
and observing that the rule phrases the requisite duty in the disjunctive (trust or confidence) 
whereas the Supreme Court has always referred to the duty in the conjunctive (trust and 
confidence)); see also Amended Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 96, at 1-2 (arguing for 
the invalidity of Rule 10b5-2 insofar as it provides for liability under the misappropriation 
theory based on the mere breach of a confidentiality agreement); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1422 (2002) 
(“[E]xtending securities liability to any relationship where ‘a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence’ extends the boundaries well beyond fiduciary relationships.” 
(quoting SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2)). 
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agreements may also arise in the course of an arm’s-length business transaction 
without any concomitant obligation of trust or loyalty.122 
Although several courts have discussed Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) in their decisions 
under the misappropriation theory,123 the court in SEC v. Cuban124 was the first 
to directly confront that rule’s validity.  In so doing, the court concluded that 
“an express or implied promise merely to keep information confidential” does 
not, standing alone, create a duty of disclosure for purposes of the 
misappropriation theory.125  It thus held Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) invalid to the extent 
that it purports to create such a duty.126  But the court also recognized that “a 
duty sufficient to support liability under the misappropriation theory can arise 
by agreement absent a preexisting fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship,” 
provided that the agreement goes beyond the mere promise of confidentiality 
to “impose on the party who receives the information the legal duty to refrain 
from trading on or otherwise using the information for personal gain.”127  In 
the court’s view, only then is a non-fiduciary’s “subsequent undisclosed use of 
the information for securities trading purposes . . . deceptive under § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.”128  The Fifth Circuit did nothing to disturb the district court’s 
holding on appeal, but it nonetheless vacated the judgment for dismissal and 
remanded the case.  On its reading of the SEC’s complaint, there was “more 
than a plausible basis” to find that the defendant had promised not to use the 
confidential information that had been conveyed to him.129 
C. Other Obstacles in Prosecuting Insider Trading Cases 
In many insider trading cases, establishing a fiduciary-like relationship of 
trust and confidence between the defendant and the issuer’s shareholders or the 
source of the information may be the easiest step in the government’s 
prosecution under Rule 10b-5.  The government, however, may encounter 
other obstacles in establishing all of the elements necessary to prove that Rule 
10b-5 has been violated.  In a civil prosecution, the SEC must establish these 
 
122 See Nagy, supra note 96, at 1362 (“[A]n agreement not to share information with 
third parties is analytically distinct from a fiduciary obligation not to take advantage of that 
information in one’s personal securities trading over a stock exchange.”). 
123 See, e.g., SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Mass. 2009); Nagy, supra 
note 96, at 1363 n.274 (citing cases discussing Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) in misappropriation theory 
decisions). 
124 SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 620 
F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
125 Id. at 725 (stating that there must be an accompanying promise not to use “the 
information for personal gain”). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 726. 
129 SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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elements by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas in a criminal 
prosecution, the DOJ must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.130 
Regardless of whether an insider trading case is prosecuted under the 
classical or the misappropriation theory, the government must prove that the 
information at issue was both nonpublic and material.  Information is 
considered “nonpublic” if it is not generally available to the investing public.  
That is, information becomes public when it has been disclosed “to achieve a 
broad dissemination to the investing public generally”131 or when, although it 
is known only by a few persons, their trading on the basis of it “has caused the 
information to be fully impounded into the price of the particular stock.”132  
These tests, however, have been criticized for their failure “to provide 
businesses with certainty, the law with clarity, the market with confidence, and 
the layman with guidance.”133  Information is considered “material” if there is 
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important 
in making an investment decision.134  Moreover, when information is “soft” or 
contingent, its materiality is to be judged by “a balancing of both the indicated 
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the 
event” in light of the totality of facts and circumstances.135  Yet, 
notwithstanding the breadth of these definitions, both courts and the SEC have 
acknowledged that securities traders generally, and analysts in particular, 
should remain free to “piece seemingly inconsequential data together with 
public information into a mosaic”136 which only becomes “material after the 
bits and pieces are assembled into one picture.”137  Whether a nonpublic fact is 
material or whether it is merely inconsequential data contributing to a mosaic 
is often a difficult question.138 
 
130 See DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (2d ed. 2008). 
131 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.12 (1983). 
132 United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993). 
133 J. Scott Colesanti, “We’ll Know It When We Can’t Hear It”: A Call for a Non-
Pornography Test Approach to Recognizing Non-Public Information, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
539, 539 (2006). 
134 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). 
135 Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(en banc)). 
136 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). 
137 Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1409 (Jan. 22, 1981) 
(“We have long recognized that an analyst may utilize nonpublic, inside information which 
in itself is immaterial in order to fill in interstices in analysis.  That process is legitimate . . . 
.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d on other 
grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
138 See Joan Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call 
for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1138-39 (2003) (“The facial simplicity of the basic 
legal standard governing materiality masks the complexities encountered by transaction 
planners, litigants, the SEC, the [DOJ], and courts in interpreting and applying that standard.  
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Rule 10b-5 cases prosecuted under the misappropriation theory present their 
own unique challenges.  Because the theory is premised on a defendant’s use 
of material nonpublic information that had been entrusted to him by its source, 
the government has the burden of establishing that the defendant actually used 
that information in making his decision to trade.139  Often, defendants in 
insider trading cases will deny their awareness of material nonpublic 
information at the time of a securities trade140 or defendants will claim that 
their reason for trading was completely unrelated to the information in their 
possession.141  Such misappropriation cases rarely involve a smoking gun.142  
Accordingly, the government generally must rely on circumstantial evidence to 
establish that the defendant was aware of material nonpublic information and 
then used that information in a securities transaction for personal profit.143 
Finally, in all insider trading cases, the government must prove that the 
defendant acted with scienter, a “mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate or defraud.”144  Assuming that the government has established a 
disclosure duty based on a fiduciary-like relationship of trust and confidence, 
the additional element of scienter is generally established through evidence 
showing that the defendant knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the 
information on which he was trading was both material and nonpublic.145  
 
The interpretation and application of the materiality standard are highly fact-dependent and 
do not always produce predictable or certain planning options or judicial results.”). 
139 Although SEC Rule 10b5-1 specifies that a securities transaction is made “on the 
basis of material nonpublic information about that security” if the person making the 
purchase or sale was “aware” of that information at the time of the trade (subject to three 
narrow affirmative defenses), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2010), it is unlikely that the Rule’s 
presumption of use from possession could apply where the Rule 10b-5 violation is premised 
on the defendant’s use of material nonpublic information under the misappropriation theory.  
See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading 
by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1147 
& n.88 (1999) (arguing that without proof of the defendant’s use of information, there 
would be no misappropriation and thus no concomitant duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5). 
140 See Frank C. Razzano, Insider Trading . . . or Not?  Lessons Learned From an 
Acquittal, 15 BUS. L. TODAY 34, 39 (2006) (discussing the “leakage” defense for denying 
knowledge of nonpublic information). 
141 See, e.g., SEC v. Alder, 137 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing defendant 
who claimed his sales of stock were preplanned and not based on his use of material 
nonpublic information). 
142 See Hearings on Insider Trading, supra note 41, at 5 (discussing the inability to take 
further action because of a lack of necessary evidence). 
143 See Razzano, supra note 140, at 41 (acknowledging that “ambiguous circumstances 
and trading may often be transformed by the prosecution into circumstantial evidence of 
insider trading,” but emphasizing that “[t]he job of defense counsel is to take those same 
circumstances and present the jury with an equally plausible and believable story consistent 
with innocence”). 
144 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
145 NAGY ET AL., supra note 130, at 552. 
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Proof that the defendant was merely negligent in failing to recognize that the 
information was material and nonpublic is not sufficient for liability to attach 
under Rule 10b-5.146 
II. THE STOP TRADING ON CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE (STOCK) ACT 
Part III of this Article makes an explicit and extensive case for why insider 
trading by members of Congress and legislative staffers breaches duties of trust 
and confidence and why it is thus already illegal under the classical and 
misappropriation theories of Rule 10b-5 liability.  Before making that case, 
however, this Part briefly examines proposed legislation and highlights some 
of its shortcomings. 
A. The Proposed Legislation 
Convinced that current law contains an “insider trading loophole” for 
congressional officials147 and that it is thus “perfectly legal to profit from 
information obtained within the Congress,”148 U.S. Representatives Brian 
Baird (D-Wash.) and Louise M. Slaughter (D-N.Y.) introduced legislation in 
2006 to “prohibit Members and employees of Congress from profiting from 
nonpublic information they obtain in their official positions.”149  
Representative Slaughter’s press release announcing the legislation posits this 
specific example: 
Congressman B learns that the Chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee has decided to provide a multi-million dollar defense contract 
for Company A in the Defense Appropriations bill.  This information has 
not been released to the public, but will almost certainly drive Company 
A’s stock price up when it becomes public knowledge.  Congressman B 
buys stock in Company A.  THIS IS NOT ILLEGAL UNDER 
CURRENT INSIDER TRADING LAWS, AND IS WHAT THE 
LEGISLATION ADDRESSES.150 
 
146 See id. 
147 Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hearings on Unfair Trading] (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter). 
148 Rep. Baird, Slaughter Seek Capitol Hill Insider Trading Ban, U.S. FED. NEWS, Mar. 
28, 2006 [hereinafter Baird March 2006 Press Release], available at 2006 WLNR 5302281. 
149 Id. 
150 Press Release, Rep. Louise M. Slaughter (D-N.Y.), STOCK Act Fact Check, 
CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER (Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.louise.house.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=433&Itemid=106 [hereinafter Slaughter 
Fact Check] (on file with author).  The press release observes that “[j]ust as anyone else, 
Members of Congress and staffers are subject to current insider trading laws,” but then it 
states that “current insider trading laws do not apply to nonpublic information about current 
or upcoming congressional activity.”  Id. 
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This bolded legal conclusion appears to be based on what this Article will 
show is the faulty premise that “members of Congress and their staff do not 
owe a duty of confidentiality to Congress.”151 
The original version of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, 
dubbed the STOCK Act,152 had fourteen additional co-sponsors in the House 
and was referred out to several Committees, but the bill failed to advance.153  
Representatives Baird and Slaughter reintroduced a similar bill in 2007154 and 
again most recently in January 2009.155  The STOCK Act was also the subject 
of a one-day hearing in July 2009 before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Committee on Financial Services.156 
The latest version of the STOCK Act, according to its co-authors, would 
“bar members of Congress and their staffs from buying and trading stocks 
using nonpublic information they obtain through their positions.”157  The 
legislation seeks to create this “bar” by amending section 10 of the Exchange 
Act to include a new subsection 10(c): 
(c) NONPUBLIC INFORMATION RELATING TO CONGRESS. – Not later than 
270 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Commission 
shall by rule prohibit any person from buying or selling the securities of 
any issuer while such person is in possession of material nonpublic 
information, as defined by the Commission, relating to any pending or 
prospective legislative action relating to such issuer if – 
(1) such information was obtained by reason of such person being a 
Member or employee of Congress; or  
(2) such information was obtained from a Member or employee of 
Congress, and such person knows that the information was so 
obtained.158 
 
151 Rep. Brian [sic] Introduces Legislation to Prohibit Insider Trading on Capitol Hill, 
U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 27, 2009 [hereinafter Baird January 2009 Press Release], available at 
2009 WLNR 1657232.  Representative Slaughter’s “STOCK Act Fact Check” press release 
includes a quote from a former SEC official’s statement that a congressman could trade on 
congressional knowledge because “he is not obligated to keep that information 
confidential.”  Slaughter Fact Check, supra note 150. 
152 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006). 
153 See Jerke, supra note 12, at 1494. 
154 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 2341, 110th Cong. (2007). 
155 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682, 111th Cong. (2009). 
156 See Hearings on Unfair Trading, supra note 147, at 3-8 (statements of Reps. Louise 
Slaughter and Brian Baird). 
157 Press Release, Rep. Brian Baird (D-Wash.), Baird Renews Call to Ban Insider 
Trading on Capitol Hill (Oct. 12, 2010) (on file with author). 
158 H.R. 682 § 2(a).  The current version of the STOCK Act also instructs the SEC to 
promulgate a broader rule that would prohibit trading or tipping based on material nonpublic 
information obtained or derived from any federal employment.  Id. (proposing to add a new 
§ 10(d) to the Exchange Act).  It also contains provisions requiring members of Congress 
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By its terms, the STOCK Act is not self-executing; rather, the Act requires the 
SEC to adopt its proposed ban on insider trading through rulemaking. 
B. The STOCK Act’s Shortcomings 
Ironies abound in the STOCK Act.  As discussed previously,159 neither 
section 10 of the Exchange Act nor Rule 10b-5 currently makes reference to 
the offense of insider trading; moreover Congress has never before answered 
the call to amend the federal securities laws to explicitly prohibit securities 
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information.160  Accordingly, rather 
than being viewed as an effective means of closing an “insider trading 
loophole,”161 the STOCK Act may well be regarded as an attempt to clarify 
insider trading law as it applies only to government officials, while leaving all 
others to struggle with the host of uncertainties inherent in the “court-drawn 
parameters of insider trading.”162  Shouldn’t Congress first act more generally 
to clarify the law of insider trading for everyone by enacting a statute that 
explicitly defines and prohibits the offense of insider trading? 
The claim by the co-authors of the STOCK Act that current law does not 
reach insider trading on congressional knowledge rings particularly hollow 
given the elasticity of the Rule 10b-5 insider trading prohibition.  Moreover, to 
the extent that this elasticity has been fueled by concerns about harms to 
investor confidence and market integrity, an elastic interpretation of Rule 10b-
5 is even more justifiable when a member of Congress uses nonpublic 
information obtained from his congressional service for personal profit.  
Indeed, even Professor Henry Manne, who has argued vehemently for the 
deregulation of corporate insider trading, recognizes that an unfettered ability 
to profit in the stock market based on nonpublic government information could 
 
and their staffs to report specified securities transactions within ninety days of the trade, id. 
§ 4(a), and requiring specified changes to the Rules of the House of Representatives, id. § 3.  
The Act also mandates rulemaking by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), id. § 2(b), although the proposed provisions regarding commodities trading may 
have been rendered moot by the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, which amends the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) 
(2006), to prohibit employees and agents of “any department or agency of the Federal 
Government” from commodities trading or tipping based on material nonpublic information 
obtained through their governmental service.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 746, 124 Stat. 1376, 1737-39 (2010). 
159 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra notes 34, 36-38, and accompanying text. 
161 Hearings on Unfair Trading, supra note 147, at 4. 
162 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048; see 
Bruce Ingersoll, Demand Rises for Law Defining Insider Trading to Provide More Than a 
Gut Feeling as a Guide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1987, at 70 (quoting attorney Michael 
Klein’s statement that insider trading law “is so laden with arcane concepts and artificial 
dividing lines that the layman couldn’t possibly understand what’s permitted and what’s 
prohibited”); sources cited supra note 34. 
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lead to decisions “made with an eye to maximizing trading profits rather than 
serving the government’s interests.”163  But even if legislative decisions are 
truly made with an eye to serving the public’s interest, insider trading by 
members of Congress nonetheless involves personal gain from the use of 
government information, a practice which, in and of itself, undermines the 
public’s trust and confidence in the government.164  These potential 
ramifications make any double standard for congressional insider trading 
particularly vexing.  As Professors Jonathan Macey and Erin O’Hara have 
argued, the SEC could be doing much more to refute the mistaken views of the 
current law: “What we find interesting is that the SEC is so willing to stretch 
the contours of the rules against insider trading when prosecuting private 
citizens . . . but is unwilling to make an appeal for a far more modest stretch of 
the rules in the context of elected public officials.”165 
The STOCK Act also fails to reach a host of hypothetical situations 
involving congressional insider trading.  Under section 2(a) of the Act, the 
SEC is instructed to prohibit transactions in “the securities of any issuer” by 
persons in possession of material nonpublic information “relating to any 
pending or prospective legislative action relating to such issuer,” if the 
information was obtained through congressional service.166  Recall 
Representative Slaughter’s example of Congressman B’s insider trading on the 
basis of nonpublic congressional information.167  Because the nonpublic 
information related to the Appropriations Committee’s award of a defense 
contract to Company A, Representative Slaughter is undoubtedly correct in 
observing that an SEC rule giving effect to the statutory language would 
prohibit Congressman B from buying that company’s stock.  Consider, 
however, these three variations: 
1. Congressman B holds Company Z’s stock in his investment portfolio 
and Company Z is Company A’s biggest competitor.  Should 
Congressman B be able to sell his stock in Company Z based on the 
 
163 HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 184 (1966).  But see id. 
at 189 (“Undoubtedly it will be difficult for many people to comprehend a justification of 
corporate insider trading and a strong condemnation of the same practice by government 
officials. . . .  [But, t]he distinction between private economic activity and government 
administration is both real and fundamental.”). 
164 See PAINTER, supra note 12, at 174 (arguing that “abuses of government information 
for private gain . . . seem incongruent with government employees’ fiduciary obligations to 
the public” and emphasizing that “[p]ublic confidence in government policy . . . could be 
compromised if inside information is likely to be abused”); see also United States v. Miss. 
Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961) (“[A] democracy is effective only if the 
people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high 
officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance 
and corruption.”). 
165 Macey & O’Hara, supra note 12, at 107. 
166 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009). 
167 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 1134 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91: 1105 
 
nonpublic information in his possession relating to Company A?  What 
constitutes good news for Company A may well have negative 
ramifications on other companies in that industry.  The co-authors of the 
STOCK Act would likely scorn such trading but, under the terms of their 
bill, Congressman B’s sale of Company Z would not seem to be covered 
because the information in Congressman B’s possession did not pertain to 
“such issuer.”  The information instead pertained to its competitor, 
Company A. 
2. What if instead of stock, Congressman B purchases options on the 
stock of Company A based on the nonpublic good news that the 
Appropriations Committee will be awarding the lucrative defense contract 
to Company A?  Options are indeed securities under the definition in the 
federal securities laws,168 but Company A will not generally be the issuer 
of those options.  Once again, the statutory phrase “of such issuer” may 
impede successful prosecution under the STOCK Act.169 
3. What if instead of information pertaining to the Appropriations 
Committee’s decision to award a multi-million dollar defense contract to 
Company A, Congressman B learns from an official at the Department of 
Defense (DOD) that it will soon be awarding a lucrative contract to 
Company A and Congressman B purchases stock in Company A based on 
that nonpublic information.  Here, the nonpublic information does relate 
to “such issuer,” but it does not relate to “any pending or prospective 
legislative action.”170  Instead, it relates to an administrative action by an 
executive department under the direction and supervision of a cabinet 
secretary who serves at the pleasure of the President.171 
If the STOCK Act is the exclusive restraint on insider trading by members 
of Congress and their staffs, the gaps that would result from the enactment of 
 
168 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006). 
169 Here, however, this gap in the STOCK Act would likely be plugged by section 20(d) 
of the Exchange Act, which renders insider trading in options unlawful in instances where 
such trading in the underlying would violate a provision in the Exchange Act.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78t(d) (“Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in 
possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability to any 
purchaser or seller of the security under any provisions of this chapter, or any rule or 
regulation thereunder, such conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, 
straddle, option, [or] privilege . . . with respect to such security . . . shall also violate and 
result in comparable liability to any purchaser or seller of that security under such provision, 
rule, or regulation.”). 
170 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (“A legislative act has 
consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business 
before it.”). 
171 For additional hypotheticals involving congressional insider trading that would likely 
fall outside of the current text of the STOCK Act, see Bainbridge, Beltway I, supra note 12, 
at 306. 
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that legislation would be enormous.  The end result could well be perverse: 
rather than banning congressional officials “from using nonpublic information 
. . . to enrich their personal portfolios,”172 the specificity of the provisions in 
the STOCK Act could provide an effective roadmap for circumventing the 
very ban that its co-authors had sought.  Another irony is that one of the 
principal impediments to a general statutory prohibition of insider trading was 
Congress’s fear that a statute could unintentionally “facilitate schemes to evade 
the law.”173 
Finally, the STOCK Act obfuscates the reality that other obstacles may 
prevent the SEC from pursuing suspected insider trading by members of 
Congress and legislative staffers, and that those other obstacles, rather than the 
lack of a legal duty to refrain from trading, may be the principal explanation 
for the paucity of investigations and the complete dearth of prosecutions.  As 
discussed previously, insider trading cases rarely involve a smoking gun and 
must generally be constructed through circumstantial evidence establishing the 
elements of liability under Rule 10b-5.174  But when trades by members of 
Congress or legislative staffers raise suspicions, the typical insider trading 
investigation may become even more complicated (and controversial).  Key 
evidence may be located within the Capitol Building and to thwart perceived 
intrusions by officials from a co-equal branch of the government, members of 
Congress might invoke either of two constitutional protections.175  First, the 
Speech or Debate Clause176 could afford some protection from investigations 
involving interviews and testimony from members of Congress and their staffs, 
or documents and records, with respect to legislative acts.177  Second, the 
 
172 Baird January 2009 Press Release, supra note 151. 
173 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048. 
174 See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. 
175 See Hearings on Unfair Trading, supra note 147, at 35-36 (testimony of Professor 
Peter J. Henning, discussing possible protection for members of Congress under the Speech 
or Debate Clause). 
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators 
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
177 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 171-72, 186 (1966) (affirming 
reversal of former Congressman Johnson’s conviction for conspiring to defraud the U.S. 
government because principal evidence consisted of a speech by the Congressman which the 
prosecution alleged had been improperly motivated by his receipt of a bribe); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that a congressman’s 
statements to the House Ethics Committee were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause); 
United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The 
Executive’s search of the Congressman’s paper files therefore violated the [Speech or 
Debate] Clause, but its copying of computer hard drives and other electronic media is 
constitutionally permissible because the Remand Order affords the Congressman an 
opportunity to assert the privilege prior to disclosure of privileged materials to the 
Executive.”); see also Hearings on Unfair Trading, supra note 147, at 35-36 (testimony of 
Professor Peter J. Henning, observing that the proposed STOCK Act would not operate as a 
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Rulemaking Clause178 could afford some protection against claims that would 
require a court to construe ambiguous provisions in congressional rules.179  
Yet, evidence pertaining to legislative acts or congressional rules could often 
be crucial in establishing that a congressional official knew, or was reckless in 
not knowing, that the information was both material and nonpublic at the time 
of his trading. 
Consider again Representative Slaughter’s example involving Congressman 
B’s trading in Company A stock based on nonpublic information obtained 
from the Appropriations Committee.  Neither the Speech or Debate Clause nor 
the Rulemaking Clause should insulate Congressman B from prosecution for 
illegal insider trading under the proposed STOCK Act,180 assuming that the 
SEC could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he knew he was in 
possession of material nonpublic information at the time of the trade and that 
the information was obtained by reason of his membership in Congress.  But 
the very existence of special constitutional protections for the Legislative 
Branch may constitute a plainly practical explanation for why the SEC might 
hesitate before launching an investigation into suspicious conduct.  The SEC is 
clearly aware of the well-publicized study of securities trading by U.S. 
Senators.181  The SEC has also, on occasion, investigated possible instances of 
securities trading on nonpublic congressional information,182 notwithstanding 
 
waiver from inquiry into privileged legislative acts and emphasizing the complexity of 
Speech or Debate Clause issues in the context of Executive Branch requests or subpoenas 
for testimony and materials). 
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings 
. . . .”). 
179 United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1305-06, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that while “it is perfectly clear that the Rulemaking Clause is not an absolute bar to 
judicial interpretation of the House Rules,” certain counts in the indictment against 
congressman may be non-justiciable under the doctrine of separation of powers because 
there is not a “judicially discoverable and manageable standard” clearly indicating whether 
alleged activity of a particular employee was “personal service” as opposed to “official 
work”). 
180 Inquiries into insider trading, like inquiries into bribes, may not implicate the Speech 
or Debate Clause at all.  See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (“[A]n 
inquiry into the purpose of a bribe does not draw in question the legislative acts of the 
defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1305, 1310 (holding that neither the 
Rulemaking Clause nor the Speech or Debate Clause barred prosecution of a congressman 
with respective to counts in the indictment that required no judicial interpretation of 
ambiguous House rules); Bainbridge, Beltway I, supra note 12, at 302-03 (explaining why 
the Speech or Debate Clause “should not bar regulation of Congressional insider trading”). 
181 See Joseph N. DiStefano, Senators’ Stock Picks Bring Profit, Scrutiny, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 2004, at El (“Staff at the Securities and Exchange Commission say they 
considered, but rejected, investigating the U.S. Senate early this year after a study found 
senators made suspiciously high profits from stocks during the 1990s bull market.”). 
182 See Jerke, supra note 12, at 1454 & n.10 (noting that SEC officials raised questions 
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the fact that Congress controls not only the scope of its statutory authority but 
also its budget.  However, according to some members of its staff, the SEC 
may not have “press[ed] the issue” of the Senate study’s results “because it is 
hard to win insider-trading cases without detailed knowledge of what, if any, 
privileged information the subjects received and proof insiders used it to 
trade.”183  The Speech or Debate Clause and the Rulemaking Clause could 
potentially hamper investigations involving suspected Rule 10b-5 violations 
when the subject is a member of Congress or a legislative staffer, and the 
STOCK Act does not – and cannot – do anything to change the practical effect 
of these constitutional protections. 
III. INSIDER TRADING BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND LEGISLATIVE 
STAFFERS 
Given the expansive application of the classical and misappropriation 
theories that has become the norm in insider trading prosecutions under Rule 
10b-5, members of Congress and legislative staffers should face an uphill 
battle if their principal defense in an SEC prosecution is that securities trading 
based on material nonpublic congressional information does not violate Rule 
10b-5.  Yet, as we have seen, the sponsors of the STOCK Act are convinced 
that “it is perfectly legal” to trade securities based on congressional 
information,184 a view that is shared by the Wall Street Journal, many others in 
the media, and even some former SEC officials.185  Distinguished securities 
law scholars have also voiced support for the STOCK Act, in large part 
because of what they perceive to be limitations under current law.186 
 
about possible tips to hedge funds of nonpublic information pertaining to an announcement 
by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist concerning asbestos legislation); cf. PAINTER, supra 
note 12, at 174 (“Tony Rudy, a senior aide to former House Republican leader Tom Delay, 
bought and sold hundreds of stocks from his computer in the Capitol Building . . . .  Both 
Rudy and Delay were eventually convicted of violating criminal laws on account of 
unrelated conduct . . . .”).  The SEC has also investigated at least one member of Congress 
for suspected securities trading based on material nonpublic information that would have 
been obtained (if at all) from a source outside of Congress.  See Floyd Norris, What Did Bill 
Frist Know and How?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at C3 (reporting that Senator Bill Frist 
sold stock in a hospital chain that his father helped found, triggering inquiries from the SEC 
and the DOJ and a complaint to the Senate Ethics Committee notwithstanding the Senator’s 
denial that he was aware of material nonpublic information). 
183 DiStefano, supra note 181 (citing Ari Gabinet, then-head of the SEC’s Philadelphia 
office, and other SEC officials). 
184 Baird March 2006 Press Release, supra note 148. 
185 See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text. 
186 See, e.g., Bainbridge, Beltway I, supra note 12, at 307 (“Although the present Act still 
needs work, it is long over due.”); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 12, at 109 (“The most 
plausible explanation for the failure of this legislation is that self-interested congressional 
officials do not want to put an end to the lucrative trading opportunities that are made 
available to them when they receive important nonpublic information in their official 
 1138 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91: 1105 
 
The notion that members of Congress and legislative staffers are not already 
prohibited from trading securities on the basis of nonpublic congressional 
knowledge is rooted in twin misconceptions: (1) a lack of regard for the broad 
and sweeping duties of entrustment that attach to public office and 
employment and (2) an unduly narrow view of the precedents establishing 
Rule 10b-5 liability for remaining silent about material nonpublic facts when 
under a fiduciary-like duty to disclose.  Members of Congress are public 
fiduciaries who owe duties of trust and confidence to a host of parties 
including the citizen-investors whom they serve, as well as the federal 
government, fellow members of Congress, and other government officials who 
rely on their loyalty and integrity.  Legislative staffers serve as agents and thus 
stand in paradigmatic fiduciary relationships with the congressional members 
and committees who employ them. 
The contention that “Members of Congress and their staff do not owe a duty 
of confidentiality to Congress”187 turns fiduciary law on its head.  As Professor 
Frankel explains in her book – and as the Restatement (Second) of Agency 
makes clear188 – a fiduciary is duty-bound to keep information confidential 
when it has been entrusted to him as part of his services.189  A fiduciary’s use 
of entrusted information for personal profit also constitutes a clear violation of 
his duty of loyalty.190  Explicit mandates with respect to confidentiality and 
non-use of nonpublic information merely confirm what is otherwise inherent in 
fiduciary relationships.  But the absence of an explicit mandate does not make 
the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality disappear. 
With these broad principles in mind, Section A focuses on insider trading by 
members of Congress and sets out the case for Rule 10b-5 liability, first under 
the classical theory and then under the complementary misappropriation 
theory.  The analysis assumes that the SEC could successfully gather evidence 
 
capacities.”). 
187 Baird January 2009 Press Release, supra note 151. 
188 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (“[A]n agent is subject to a 
duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by 
the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in 
violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury at the principal.”). 
189 See FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 7 (“Entrustment is the most important aspect of 
fiduciary relationships.  It greatly affects the existence, nature, and the rules of fiduciary 
relationships.  The word ‘confidence’ that courts occasionally use may mean more than 
mere confiding in the other party.  It can mean confiding secrets as well.”). 
190 See id. at 108 (“The duty of loyalty supports the main purpose of fiduciary law: to 
prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power.”); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395.  Professor Frankel goes on to explain that 
the duty of loyalty is manifested by “important preventive rules” that prohibit actions “even 
though they are not necessarily injurious to entrustors.”  FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 108.  
These preventive rules “act to dampen the fiduciaries’ temptations to misappropriate 
entrusted property or power, or to justify benefitting themselves, and establish a continuous 
reminder that entrusted property and power do not belong to the fiduciaries.”  Id. 
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and prove that securities were traded on the basis of material nonpublic 
congressional information.  Using hypothetical facts such as those identified in 
Representative Slaughter’s example, the conclusion that Congressman B 
breached a duty of trust and confidence and thereby violated Rule 10b-5 can be 
established as a matter of law.  Section B argues that despite the strength of the 
legal arguments for Rule 10b-5 liability, education, rather than prosecution, 
may be the SEC’s most effective enforcement tool.  Section C focuses on 
legislative staffers and other congressional employees, and Section D briefly 
examines issues relating to “tips” which convey material nonpublic 
congressional information. 
A. Members of Congress 
1. The Case for Liability under the Classical Theory 
As we have seen, Rule 10b-5 liability under the classical theory “is premised 
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence 
between parties to a transaction.”191  Thus, for Congressman B’s silence about 
the multi-million defense contract to be deemed a fraud under the classical 
theory, he would have to owe a disclosure duty to Company A stockholders 
who sold their shares without the benefit of the Appropriations Committee’s 
information which would have made their stock more valuable.  This duty of 
disclosure can arise from either of two relationships: (a) from the relationship 
of trust and confidence that exists between members of Congress and the 
securities issuers that have business before them (rendering congressional 
officials temporary or constructive insiders of the issuer) or (b) from the 
relationship of trust and confidence that exists between members of Congress 
and citizen-investors (some of whom are shareholders in Company A). 
a. Temporary or Constructive Insiders 
Under circumstances such as those postulated by Representative Slaughter, 
Congressman B could be viewed as a temporary or constructive insider of 
Company A since he was entrusted with access to nonpublic information 
pertaining to the Company’s imminent receipt of a lucrative defense contract.  
Indeed, Congress itself has gone so far as to recognize that government 
officials can, under certain circumstances, assume the status of constructive 
insiders.  In justifying the view that a legislative definition of insider trading is 
unnecessary, the Committee Report accompanying the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) observed (with remarkable prescience) that: 
Underwriters, investment analysts, lawyers, accountants, financial 
printers, government officials, and others often learn of profit-or-loss 
forecasts, imminent tender offers, mineral strikes, oil discoveries, 
lucrative contracts, and product failures before such information is 
 
191 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
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available to the investing public.  Insider trading by such persons 
undermines confidence in the markets in the same manner as trading by 
corporate insiders.  The Supreme Court recently noted [in Dirks] that 
under certain conditions, such as where corporate information is revealed 
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant working 
for the corporation, those “outsiders” may be treated as constructive 
insiders.  The Committee agrees with this analysis and expects the 
Commission to continue to pursue violations by such persons.192 
Professor Louis Loss likewise included government officials in a suggested 
category of “quasi-insiders” who would be prohibited from insider trading 
under section 1603 of the American Law Institute’s proposed Federal 
Securities Code which was presented to Congress, but never adopted.193 
Viewing members of Congress as temporary or constructive insiders, at least 
when they have been entrusted with nonpublic company-specific information 
like the imminent receipt of a defense contract (or, for example, proprietary 
corporate information provided pursuant to a congressional committee’s 
investigative subpoena), fits well within the classical framework of Chiarella 
and Dirks.  Like an issuer’s traditional insiders and temporary agents, as well 
as their tippees, congressional officials should not be permitted to take 
advantage of “information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”194  It would thus be quite 
reasonable to impute a disclosure obligation when a member of Congress 
trades with shareholders of the issuer who were not privy to facts affecting the 
value of their shares.  The failure to disclose to shareholders in such a 
circumstance would constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
b. Public Fiduciaries and Citizen-Investors 
Viewing Congressman B as a public fiduciary who owes disclosure duties to 
at least some of the shareholders of Company A provides an alternative avenue 
under the classical theory for rendering his stock purchases a fraud.  Moreover, 
arguments predicated on members of Congress as public fiduciaries would 
apply in a host of other instances where the temporary or constrictive insider 
theory may not.  For instance, if the information in Congressman B’s 
possession concerned an anticipated change in the tax laws that had yet to be 
 
192 H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 4 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277 
(emphasis added). 
193 FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 cmt. (3)(d) (1980) (“It would be convenient to have a new 
category of ‘quasi insider’ that would cover people like (i) judges’ clerks who trade on 
information in unpublished opinions, [and] (ii) Federal Reserve Bank employees who trade 
with knowledge of an imminent change in the margin rate . . . .” (citing the Peltz, Blyth, and 
Keane decisions discussed at infra notes 101, 269-276)).  Chief Justice Burger specifically 
referenced this ALI proposal in his dissenting opinion in Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 242 n.3 
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
194 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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announced publicly, viewing Congressman B as a constructive insider of each 
and every company affected by that law may well be too much of a stretch.  
Yet, if Congressman B bought stock in Companies X, Y, and Z based on 
material nonpublic information about such a change in the tax law, the SEC 
would have a compelling argument that Congressman B owes at least some of 
the shareholders with whom he trades a disclosure obligation in accordance 
with his status as a public fiduciary. 
As Professor Frankel observes in the epilogue to her book, “[p]rivate sector 
fiduciaries and government officials have much in common” because the law 
governing both sets of actors “address similar problems, and the guiding 
principles in both legal systems are similar: prevent misappropriation of 
entrustment and ensure a diligent and expert performance of services.”195  Here 
Professor Frankel quotes Professor Robert Natelson’s forceful argument that 
the “Constitution was conceived of as a fiduciary instrument, instituting, to the 
extent practicable, fiduciary standards.”196  Professor Frankel also reminds us 
that the U.S. Constitution refers in several places to “public Trust”197 and to 
public offices being “of Trust.”198  She emphasizes that the “freedom and well-
being of this country’s people depend on the accountability of both [private 
and government] fiduciaries and on preventing them from misappropriating 
their entrusted property and power.”199  Professor Richard Painter builds on 
Professor Frankel’s work when he recognizes that “[p]ersons who choose 
elected officials are entrustors to whom officials owe fiduciary obligations.”200  
He notes specifically that “[f]or members of Congress, the entrustors are the 
voters in their districts,” though he recognizes that “fiduciary obligations may 
also be owed to other persons.”201 
 
195 FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 279.  To be sure, some scholars take issue with Professor 
Frankel’s highly expansive conception of fiduciary duties and relationships.  See, e.g., Larry 
Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 901-03 (2011) (arguing for a 
narrower definition of fiduciary duty and a more precise application that would turn on the 
concept of unselfishness); Smith, supra note 121, at 1402 (setting forth a definition of a 
fiduciary relationship that would turn on three core requirements: “when one party (the 
‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion 
with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary” (emphasis added)).  
Members of Congress, as representatives elected to serve the public interest, may well fit 
within some of these other, more restrictive, conceptions of the term “fiduciary.” 
196 FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 280 (quoting Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of 
Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the 
Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 281 (2007)). 
197 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
198 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
199 FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 286. 
200 PAINTER, supra note 12, at 2. 
201 Id.  For law review articles recognizing that government officials are fiduciaries who 
operate under strict limitations with respect to their use of government power and property, 
see Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics In Government Yet?: An Answer from 
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In arguing against the classical theory’s application to his purchases of stock 
in Company A, Congressman B might contend that his silence about material 
facts does not defraud the issuer’s selling shareholders because his duties of 
entrustment vis-à-vis the public are not characteristic of the type of fiduciary-
like relationship that has triggered the requisite duty to disclose under prior 
Rule 10b-5 insider trading precedents.  To bolster this argument, he would 
likely point out that “[f]iduciary law does not provide citizens with broad 
equitable remedies against government officials for breach of trust,”202 and that 
while his constituents can vote him out of office for conduct inconsistent with 
trust and loyalty, citizen-investors “cannot sue for breach of fiduciary duty.”203  
Moreover, as a member of the House of Representatives, his responsibilities as 
a public official are unique because “Congress is not a job like any other, it is a 
constitutional role to be played upon a constitutional stage.”204  These 
observations are all quite valid, as far as they go. 
But members of Congress can be held accountable for their fiduciary 
breaches in at least two additional ways.  First, a member of Congress can be 
punished by his own House for acts that constitute a betrayal of the public’s 
trust.  Second, at least some breaches of the public’s trust by a member of 
Congress can be prosecuted by the Executive Branch under criminal and civil 
statutes.  These vehicles for accountability evidence that congressional duties 
of entrustment are both bona fide and enforceable, even if citizens typically do 
not have standing to vindicate those rights in court. 
Congress’s authority to punish its own members for breaches of entrustment 
is grounded in the Constitution’s text, which states that: “Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly 
Behavior, and with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.”205  This 
 
Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57 (1996); Joseph J. Kalo, Deterring Misuse of 
Confidential Government Information: A Proposed Citizens’ Action, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1577 
(1974); David M. Lawrence, Local Government Officials as Fiduciaries: The Appropriate 
Standard, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1993); Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Former 
Government Employees, 90 YALE L.J. 189 (1980). 
202 PAINTER, supra note 12, at 3. 
203 Id. 
204 United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  For an extensive examination of this Clause (including 
the Framers’ intent and its application from the nation’s founding through modern times), 
see Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of 
Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389 (1994).  Professor Ray argues that 
while the text of the Constitution may be read to provide for an alternative avenue of 
punishment under the Impeachment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, “history has effectively 
closed that option.”  Ray, supra, at 391; see also id. at 397-401 (discussing the Senate’s 
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the 1797 impeachment of then-expelled Senator 
William Blount and speculating that the Senate (which reached its decision in closed 
session) may have accepted Blount’s argument that the Senate’s power of expulsion renders 
impeachment unnecessary and/or that the Constitution does not expressly include members 
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self-discipline for “disorderly Behavior” is to be administered by the member’s 
own House, and as the Supreme Court recognized in In re Chapman,206 even 
the “right to expel” – the ultimate and the rarest form of congressional self-
discipline – “extends to all cases where the offense is such as in the judgment 
of the Senate [or the House of Representatives] is inconsistent with the trust 
and duty of a member.”207 
Although Congress is frequently criticized for its reluctance to administer 
any self-discipline (even through the relatively mild sanctions of 
denouncement or reprimand), there is no doubt that each House has the 
authority to proscribe and sanction betrayals of the public trust.208  Indeed, 
both the Senate Ethics Manual209 and the House Ethics Manual210 reference not 
only their own expansive ethical standards and jurisdiction211 but also a general 
Code of Ethics for Government Service,212 which sets out ten broadly-worded 
ethical standards that should be adhered to “by all Government employees, 
including officeholders . . . ever conscious that public office is a public 
trust.”213  Reflecting the fiduciary obligation of loyalty, the Code’s eighth 
provision specifies that an official should “never use any information coming 
to him confidentially in the performance of government duties as a means for 
 
of Congress in the Impeachment Clause). 
206 166 U.S. 661 (1897). 
207 Id. at 669-70. 
208 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Self-Regulation of Congressional Ethics: Substance 
and Structure, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 45-46 (1996) (observing that at least one Senator has 
been censured for actions “derogate[ing] from the public trust expected of a senator” even 
though the conduct at issue had not violated “any specific law or rule in force at the time,” 
but acknowledging that “neither the House nor the Senate has taken formal disciplinary 
action on a frequent basis” (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted)); Ray, 
supra note 205, at 390 (discussing the disciplinary role assigned to Congress under the 
Constitution, but contending that Congress’s “performance to date scarcely vindicates its 
claim to effective self-discipline”).  See generally PAINTER, supra note 12, at 143-63 
(discussing recent Legislative Branch ethics reform). 
209 STAFF OF S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 
(Comm. Print 2003), available at http://ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf. 
210 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., HOUSE 
ETHICS MANUAL (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/ 
2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf. 
211 Id. at 1-4 (setting out “General Ethical Standards”); SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 309-11 
(setting out “The Senate Code of Official Conduct”). 
212 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 355 (including the Code in the appendix); SENATE ETHICS 
MANUAL 7 (referencing the Code).  The Code has been explicitly incorporated into House 
ethics rules.  HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 20.  And while the Senate’s ethics rules do not 
incorporate the Code specifically, the Senate Ethics Manual does identify the Code as a 
“source of Committee jurisdiction.”  SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 7. 
213 Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. 
B12 (1958). 
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making personal profit,”214 and there has been at least one disciplinary 
reprimand of a congressman found to have unjustly enriched himself in 
violation of this provision.215 
A member of Congress can likewise be held accountable for breaches of 
entrustment through prosecutions by the Executive Branch under federal 
criminal and civil statutes, including statutes tailored to conduct by members 
of Congress (as a specific class or as part of a broader class of “public 
officials”)216 and statutes of general application.217  The federal statutes 
prohibiting mail fraud218 and wire fraud219 constitute cogent examples of 
generally-applicable criminal statutes which can encompass a member of 
Congress’s breach of the “fiduciary duty of loyalty” that he owes to the 
American public.220 
 
214 Id. 
215 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 249 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL 
CONDUCT, IN THE MATTER OF A COMPLAINT AGAINST REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT L.F. SIKES, 
H. REP. 94-1364, at 3 (1976)).  The House Ethics Manual recounts that the Congressman had 
purchased 2,500 shares of a privately-held bank’s stock while he was actively assisting in 
the establishment of that bank on a military base, and observes that had the Congressman 
requested an opinion of the “House Standards Committee in advance about the propriety of 
the investment, it would have been disapproved.”  Id. 
216 Congress has enacted a host of anti-corruption statutes that expressly apply to 
government officials, including members of Congress.  See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 
408 U.S. 501, 502 n.2, 528-29 (1972) (holding that the Speech and Debate Clause does not 
bar prosecution of congressman for violation of an anti-bribery statute applying to “any 
public official” including any “member of Congress” even if a congressman accepted the 
bribe in exchange for a promise relating to an official act); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 301-18 (4th ed.) (discussing anti-bribery statutes and “conflict of interest” statutes 
applying to “public officials,” including the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a) 
(2006), which prohibits members of Congress from seeking or accepting “anything of 
value” from any person “whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance 
or nonperformance of the individual’s official duties”). 
217 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 216, at 310 n.d (citing the federal mail and wire 
fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006), the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) 
(criminalizing extortion), and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006), as examples of 
federal criminal statutes that might be used to prosecute “official legislative conduct at 
either the federal or state level”). 
218 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (prohibiting “schemes or artifices to defraud” through the use of the 
mails). 
219 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (prohibiting “schemes or artifices to defraud” through use of 
electronic wires, radio, or television). 
220 Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the Supreme Court’s 
Skilling Decision: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) 
[hereinafter Skilling Decision Hearing] (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/9-28-
10%20Breuer%20Testimony.pdf (stating that for decades, federal prosecutors have used the 
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Several members of Congress have been indicted, and have served (or are 
serving) time in prison, for honest services fraud prosecuted under either 18 
U.S.C. § 1346221 or the so-called pre-McNally interpretations of the federal 
mail and wire fraud statutes.222  Congress enacted § 1346 in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. United States223 which, in the context 
of a prosecution involving the corruption of a state public official, narrowly 
interpreted the mail fraud statute to apply only to fraudulent deprivations of 
“property rights” and not to schemes “defraud[ing] citizens of their intangible 
rights to honest and impartial government.”224  Section 1346 reflects 
 
mail and wire fraud statutes to reach “schemes designed to deprive citizens of the honest 
services of public and private officials who owe them a fiduciary duty of loyalty” and 
observing that some of these prosecutions and convictions have involved members of 
Congress (emphasis added)). 
221 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (“For the purposes of this chapter [(the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes)], the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”). 
222 See Skilling Decision Hearing, supra note 220 (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, 
testifying that, in connection with schemes involving bribery, “[f]ormer Congressman 
William Jefferson was convicted in 2009 of honest services fraud” and “[f]ormer 
Congressman Robert Ney pleaded guilty in 2006 to honest services fraud conspiracy”).  
Other members of Congress who were indicted under § 1346 for honest-services fraud 
include: former Illinois Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, see infra notes 249-252; former 
California Congressman Randy Cunningham, see Information at 3-4; United States v. 
Cunningham, Criminal Case No. 05cr2137-LAB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005) (charging use of 
the mails to conspire “to devise a material scheme to defraud the United States of its right to 
defendant’s honest services, including its right to his conscientious, loyal, faithful, 
disinterested, unbiased service, to be performed free of deceit, undue influence, conflict of 
interest, self-enrichment, self-dealing, concealment, bribery, fraud and corruption”); and 
former Arizona Congressman Richard Renzi, see Indictment at 10-11, United States v. 
Renzi, CR08-0212TUC (D. Ariz. filed Feb. 20, 2008) (charging use of the wires to “devise a 
scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the United States of its intangible right to the 
honest services of Renzi performed free from deceit, self-dealing, bias and concealment” for 
purposes including the concealment of Renzi’s financial relationship with co-conspirators 
from private persons, “the United States House of Representatives, and the public”).  For a 
pre-McNally indictment charging former Congressman Charles Diggs with honest-services 
fraud in connection with a kick-back scheme, see infra notes 232-233 and accompanying 
text. 
223 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
224 Id. at 355.  The majority in McNally noted that, like the federal mail fraud statute 
under which the defendant had been prosecuted, the federal anti-conspiracy statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 371, also uses the words “to defraud.”  Id. at 358 n.8 (quoting statutory language 
making criminal any conspiracy “to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any 
manner or for any purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The majority further 
observed that prior Court precedents had interpreted § 371 (or its statutory predecessor) to 
reach acts that not only defraud “the Government out of property or money,” but also acts 
that “interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful government functions.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, the Court acknowledged that the words “to defraud” 
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Congress’s intent to restore the pre-McNally honest-services fraud doctrine,225 
but just last term in Skilling v. United States,226 the Court gave § 1346 a narrow 
construction, holding that constitutional due process requires the statute’s 
proscription of fraudulent deprivations of “the intangible right of honest 
services” to criminalize only conduct involving bribes or kickbacks.227 
The fact that members of Congress may be criminally liable for bribe-and-
kickback schemes that “defraud and deprive American citizens of their right to 
[receive] honest services” presupposes that congressional loyalty and honesty 
are positive public rights and enforceable legal interests.228  This 
presupposition squares with the McNally Court’s description of the prior case 
law as holding that “a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the public, and a 
misuse of his office for private gain is a fraud.”229  In his Skilling dissent, 
Justice Scalia observed disparagingly that “[n]one of the ‘honest services’ 
cases, neither those pertaining to public officials nor those pertaining to the 
private employees, defined the nature and the content of the fiduciary duty 
central to the ‘fraud’ offense.”230  Yet, for the Skilling majority, such 
imprecision was of no moment because in its view, in the bribe-and-kickback 
cases held to be within § 1346’s constitutional scope, “[t]he existence of a 
fiduciary relationship, under any definition of that term, was usually beyond 
dispute.”231  Among many of the honor-services fraud precedents “blessed” by 
 
could have different meanings in each statute given the statutes’ differing origins and aims.  
Id. (“Section 371 is a statute aimed at protecting the Federal Government alone; however, 
the mail fraud statute . . . had its origin in the desire to protect individual property rights . . . 
.”).  The Court then concluded that “any benefit which the Government derives from the 
[mail fraud] statute must be limited to the Government’s interest as property holder.”  Id. 
225 See Craig M. Bradley, Not All Dishonesty is ‘Honest Services’ Fraud, 46 TRIAL 48, 
49 (2010).  In McNally, the Court instructed that “if Congress desires to go further, it must 
speak more clearly.”  McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.  As Professor Bradley observes, in response 
to McNally, “Congress did speak – if not very clearly – when it . . . enact[ed] the honest-
services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, in 1988.”  Bradley, supra, at 49. 
226 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
227 Id. at 2931 (“[Section] 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-
McNally case law.”).  The Court reached this holding because “there is no doubt that 
Congress intended § 1346 to reach at least bribes and kickbacks,” whereas “[r]eading the 
statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct . . . would raise the due process 
concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.”  Id. 
228 United States v. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721, 725 (E.D. Va. 2008) (denying 
motion to dismiss counts of indictment charging then-Congressman William Jefferson with 
“a scheme to defraud and deprive American citizens of their right to [his] honest services by 
taking bribes . . . in return for [his] performance of various official acts” and concluding that 
these honest-services fraud counts were not unconstitutionally vague); see sources cited 
supra note 222. 
229 McNally, 483 U.S. at 355. 
230 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. at 2930 n.41 (majority opinion).  The Court then provided three specific examples 
of undisputed fiduciary relationships (public official-public, employee-employer, and union 
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the Skilling Court was United States v. Diggs,232 a 1979 D.C. Circuit decision 
that affirmed former Michigan Congressman Charles Digg’s conviction for 
mail fraud in connection with a staff salary kick-back scheme that “defrauded 
the public of not only substantial sums of money but of his faithful and honest 
services.”233 
The public fiduciary principles observed by Professor Frankel with respect 
to the appropriate use of government property and power, when combined with 
the specific application of those principles in the context of congressional self-
discipline and § 1346 honest-services fraud prosecutions against members of 
Congress, form a powerful case that Congressman B would violate Rule 10b-5 
under the classical theory were he to use material nonpublic information 
concerning an unannounced defense contract (or an anticipated change in the 
tax laws) to personally profit from trading in the securities of an affected 
company.  To be sure, the Court in Chiarella and Dirks insisted that there is no 
“general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions 
based on material, nonpublic information.”234  But as a person who has been 
entrusted with public power and authority for a public purpose, Congressman 
B stands in a “special relationship” with the members of the public with whom 
he trades,235 and Congressman B would be using information intended only for 
government purposes for his own personal gain.236  Accordingly, as a person 
who owes bona fide and enforceable duties of trust and confidence to the 
general public (including at least some of Company A’s shareholders), 
Congressman B would violate Rule 10b-5 were he to purchase stock while 
remaining silent about material nonpublic facts pertaining to an anticipated 
change in the tax law or the imminent award of a defense contract by either the 
Appropriations Committee or the DOD.237 
 
official-union members) and followed those with a “see generally” to Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980), with a parenthetical explaining that Chiarella discussed 
the “established doctrine that [a fiduciary] duty arises from a specific relationship between 
two parties.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
232 United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  Diggs was cited in Skilling, 
130 S. Ct. at 2929 n.38. 
233 Diggs, 613 F.2d. at 998; see infra notes 242-248. 
234 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
235 Cf. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority 
had predicated insider trading liability on a “special relationship akin to fiduciary duty” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 
153 (1972); supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
236 Cf. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (“[The] fraud derives from the inherent unfairness involved 
where one takes advantage of information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
237 Although they speculate that a narrower view could prevail, Professors Macey and 
O’Hara have expressed support for the classical theory’s application to members of 
Congress who serve as public fiduciaries.  See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 12, at 107 
 1148 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91: 1105 
 
2. The Case for Liability under the Misappropriation Theory 
Because Congressman B’s use of the Appropriations Committee’s 
nonpublic information about the award of a defense contract would constitute a 
self-serving use of government property, the complementary misappropriation 
theory would provide an alternative ground for liability under Rule 10b-5.  As 
a public servant and an official of the federal government, Congressman B’s 
undisclosed misuse of nonpublic information would deceive a host of persons 
including: a) the United States and its citizens as “entrustors,” b) the federal 
government in its capacity as his employer, and c) his fellow members of 
Congress or other government officials.  Moreover, even in the absence of a 
court’s willingness to regard Congressman B as a fiduciary owing disclosure 
duties to these persons, a fourth basis of liability under the misappropriation 
theory could attach from Congressman B’s undisclosed breach of an obligation 
under the Code of Ethics for Government Service to never use confidential 
information as a means for making personal profit. 
a. The United States and its Citizens as “Entrustors” of Property 
The argument under the misappropriation theory for Congressman B’s 
deception of the federal government and its citizens reflects many of the same 
fiduciary principles discussed above under the classical theory.238  Under the 
misappropriation theory, Congressman B would be defrauding the government 
and its citizens by using their information for personal gain in securities 
trading while maintaining a pretense of loyalty.239  Thus, Congressman B 
 
(“[E]lected officials who serve on committees and, in their official capacities . . . would 
clearly seem to owe a ‘generalized’ fiduciary duty to the public, including the securities 
markets.”).  Professor Donald Langevoort advanced a similar argument years before.  
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella 
Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1982) (maintaining that the investors trading with 
a government official “could be viewed as members of the broader class – the country’s 
citizens – to whom the official does owe some duty of fair dealing”).  Professor Langevoort 
points out that “[l]ike the corporate insider, the government official has an advantageous 
position as compared to the persons whom he is charged with serving” and thus both insider 
and government officials could be governed by the same principle “of preventing unjust 
enrichment.”  Id.; see also John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and 
Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1374-76 (1981) (discussing insider trading by 
government officials and concluding that “a public official using official information for 
private gain violates a panoply of legal restrictions that trigger a disclose or abstain 
obligation under the common law and rule 10b-5”).  For additional commentary written pre-
Chiarella, see Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to 
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 823-24 (1973) (“[I]t is reasonable to 
expect that such information will not be used for the personal advantage of [government 
officials] who are given preferred access to it.”). 
238 Cf. LANGEVOORT, supra note 74, at § 6-2 (“Virtually all cases that could be brought 
[under the classical theory] can also be styled as misappropriation cases.”). 
239 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997) (“A fiduciary who 
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“deal[s] in deception”240 and his purchases of stock in Company A would 
violate Rule 10b-5.  The first subsection below discusses prior prosecutions of 
members of Congress for defrauding the United States and its citizens through 
the misappropriation of funds and other tangible property; the second 
subsection discusses a government’s property interest in its material nonpublic 
information. 
i. Prosecutions for Fraudulent Misappropriation of Funds and 
Tangible Property 
Although there has yet to be a federal prosecution for the undisclosed, self-
serving use of congressional knowledge for personal profit, over the last half-
century, several members of Congress have been indicted for defrauding the 
federal government and its citizen through the misappropriation of funds and 
other tangible property.241  In United States v. Diggs,242 for example, the D.C. 
Circuit considered an appeal by former Michigan Congressman Charles Diggs.  
In affirming his conviction for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the court 
recounted the jury’s findings that the Congressman had greatly increased the 
salaries nominally paid to his staff out of the clerk hire allowance, and that he 
had used the increases himself for personal expenses.243  The D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the Congressman’s conduct “amounted to no less than a scheme 
to take illicit kick-backs” and that this scheme “defrauded the public of not 
only substantial sums of money but of his faithful and honest services.”244  
Although the constitutionality of the honest-services fraud part of this holding 
may have been subject to question prior to Skilling,245 fraudulent deprivations 
of money and other tangible property have always been at the core of the 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes.246  Diggs was sentenced to three years in 
 
[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for 
personal gain dupes or defrauds the principal.” (alteration in original, citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); supra text accompanying note 78. 
240 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-54. 
241 See generally Clark, supra note 201, at 59-60 (discussing a host of ethics 
investigations targeting members of Congress); Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the 
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 663-72 (2004) (setting out detailed appendix listing nearly 100 
members of Congress who have been indicted for a wide range of criminal offenses, some 
of which involved the misappropriation of federal property). 
242 United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
243 Id. at 994-95. 
244 Id. at 998. 
245 See supra notes 226-227. 
246 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (holding that the mail fraud 
statute was “limited in its scope to the protection of property rights” and observing that 
property included money or other tangible property); supra notes 223-225. 
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prison,247 and agreed to accept a censure by the House “in return for an end to 
the committee investigation of his financial dealings.”248 
Former Illinois Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski provides a second 
example of a member of Congress who was charged under general statutes 
with offenses involving, among other things, the fraudulent misappropriation 
of government funds and property.  In United States v. Rostenkowski,249 the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that the Speech or Debate Clause and the 
Rulemaking Clause stood as an absolute bar to a seventeen count indictment 
“alleging generally that Rostenkowski and others had devised . . . a scheme to 
defraud the United States of its money, its property, and its right to 
Rostenkowski’s fair and honest services” in connection with staff salary 
kickbacks, misappropriation of goods worth over $40,000 (including crystal 
sculptures, wooden armchairs, and fine china from the House Stationary 
Store), and misappropriation of funds by exchanging stamp vouchers for 
cash.250  Rostenkowski was subsequently defeated in his bid for re-election,251 
served fifteen months in prison after pleading guilty in 1996 to two felony mail 
fraud counts, and was pardoned in 2000 by President Clinton.252 
Lest it appear that misappropriation of congressional funds and property 
plagues only the House of Representatives, former Minnesota Senator David 
Durenberger’s prosecution and subsequent guilty plea indicates otherwise.  
Durenberger had been charged with making and presenting false claims for 
Senate reimbursement of his travel expenses,253 in violation of the anti-
conspiracy statute254 and the False Claims Act.255  In affirming the district 
court’s denial of the Senator’s motion to dismiss the indictment, the D.C. 
 
247 Lerner, supra note 241, at 666. 
248 Ray, supra note 205, at 414. 
249 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
250 Id. at 1294 (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted).  The seventeen 
counts included charges that Rostenkowski had violated the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2006), the anti-conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(2006), and the prohibition against conversion of U.S. funds and property, 18 U.S.C. § 641 
(2006). 
251 Clark, supra note 201, at 60 n.9. 
252 Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Issues a Pardon To Ex-Rep. Rostenkowski, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
23, 2000, at A12. 
253 United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
254 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“If two or more persons conspire . . . to defraud the United States, or 
any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do 
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
255 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006) (“Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the 
civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, 
any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing 
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years 
and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.”). 
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Circuit observed that Durenberger had allegedly concealed his ownership 
interest in a condominium while claiming entitlement for $3825 in 
reimbursement for overnight stays.256  Durenberger was then denounced by the 
Senate, did not seek re-election, and later pleaded guilty to misdemeanor 
charges.257 
ii. Material Nonpublic Information as Intangible Property 
As we have seen, in O’Hagan,258 the Supreme Court endorsed the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 because a 
“fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to 
purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, 
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”259  The 
O’Hagan Court further recognized that the material nonpublic information on 
which the defendant-attorney had traded qualified as “property.”260  In so 
ruling, the Court relied on Carpenter v. United States,261 a decision which held 
unanimously that a Wall Street Journal reporter’s stock tips about companies 
mentioned in his forthcoming “Heard on the Street” columns constituted a 
fraudulent misappropriation of the Journal’s “property” within the meaning of 
the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.262  The Carpenter Court specifically 
concluded that “[t]he concept of fraud includes the act of embezzlement, which 
is the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods 
entrusted to one’s case by another,”263 and that the “intangible nature” of 
 
256 Durenberger, 48 F.3d at 1241. 
257 Clark, supra note 201, at 59 n.7.  To be sure, each of the fraudulent misappropriation 
schemes discussed above involved a member of Congress’s allegedly false statements as 
well as material omissions of fact.  Congressman Diggs, for example, was also convicted of 
making false statements to a U.S. agency (the House of Representatives Office of Finance) 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).  United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 990-91 
(D.C. Cir. 1979).  Yet, presumably, the public that Congressman Diggs defrauded of 
“substantial sums of money,” id. at 998, was unaware of the false statements and thus did 
not rely on them to their detriment.  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit Court’s holding in Diggs 
implicitly recognizes that the public can be defrauded through a congressman’s silence 
about breaches of trust and loyalty in connection with acts of misappropriation. 
258 See supra Part I.A.2. 
259 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
260 Id. at 654. 
261 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
262 Id. at 24. 
263 Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Carpenter Court also quoted the 
New York Court of Appeals’ observation that “a person who acquires special knowledge or 
information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to 
exploit that knowledge or information for his own personal benefit but must account to his 
principal for any profits derived therefrom.”  Id. at 27-28 (quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 
248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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information “does not make it any less ‘property.’”264  Yet, while it was 
unanimous in upholding the defendant’s convictions for mail and wire fraud, 
the Court had split 4-4 on the validity of the misappropriation theory for 
purposes of the defendants’ Rule 10b-5 convictions.265  The Court’s 
subsequent 6-3 endorsement of the misappropriation theory in O’Hagan 
therefore broke the previous Rule 10b-5 deadlock in Carpenter. 
Yet, prior to the decisions in O’Hagan and Carpenter, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, had long-recognized that the secret use of nonpublic 
government information defrauds the government and its citizens, even though 
the use of such information had not been viewed as a fraudulent deprivation of 
property, as such.  Indeed, more than a century ago in Haas v. Henkel,266 the 
Supreme Court reviewed an indictment charging the co-defendants with a 
conspiracy to obtain crop reports from a statistician in the Department of 
Agriculture “in advance of general publicity, and to use such information in 
speculating upon the cotton market.”267  The Court concluded that the 
conspiracy, if proven, would have defrauded “the United States by defeating, 
obstructing, and impairing it in the exercise of its governmental function in the 
regular and official duty of publicly promulgating fair, impartial and accurate 
reports concerning the cotton crop.”268 
Several U.S. circuit courts had likewise upheld criminal convictions in cases 
where the government and its citizens had been “defrauded” by schemes 
involving the use of nonpublic government information misappropriated for 
personal profit.  A leading decision comes from the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Peltz,269 in which Judge Friendly held that evidence of an agreement 
to secure nonpublic information from the SEC in order to profit in the stock 
market supported a jury verdict that the defendant had engaged in an illegal 
conspiracy to defraud the United States and the SEC.270  In affirming the 
defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371, Judge Friendly observed that: 
Public confidence essential to the effective functioning of government 
would be seriously impaired by any arrangement that would enable a few 
individuals to profit from advance knowledge of governmental action.  
The very making of a plan whereby a government employee will divulge 
material information which he knows he should not is ‘dishonest’ . . . 
regardless of whether such plan is secured by consideration.271 
 
264 Id. at 25. 
265 Id. at 24 (“The Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the 
securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those counts.”). 
266 216 U.S. 462 (1910). 
267 Id. at 478. 
268 Id. 
269 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970). 
270 Id. at 49, 52. 
271 Id. at 52 (footnote and citations omitted). 
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Another important decision is United States v. Keane,272 which affirmed a 
jury verdict convicting a city councilman of violating the federal mail fraud 
statute in connection with a scheme involving, among other things, the use of 
“inside information” in the purchase of tax delinquent properties through 
nominees.273  The indictment alleged that: 
[The] scheme defrauded the city of Chicago, its citizens and Keane’s 
fellow alderman of their right to the “conscientious, loyal, faithful, 
disinterested and unbiased services, decisions, actions and performance of 
official duties” by the defendant and their right to have the City’s 
business and its affairs conducted “honestly, impartially, free from deceit, 
craft, trickery, corruption, fraud, undue influence, dishonesty, conflict of 
interest, unlawful obstruction and impairments, and in accordance with 
the laws of the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago . . . .”274 
The Seventh Circuit held explicitly that it was “clearly improper and therefore 
actionable under the mail fraud statute for the defendant to make use of inside 
advance information obtained by virtue of his official position for his own 
personal gain.”275  Citing Peltz and two other cases involving securities trading 
by corporate officials based on confidential corporate information, the court 
emphasized that those precedents “taken together show that advance 
dissemination and use of governmental information by a few individuals 
impairs the functioning of government and that when the use is made by a 
public official it amounts to a breach of a fiduciary duty which is clearly 
actionable under the mail fraud statute.”276 
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bryan277 is perhaps the most 
instructive because, having been decided after Carpenter, it recognized that a 
West Virginia Lottery Commission Director’s misappropriation of nonpublic 
government contract information for his own securities trading purposes can 
constitute a fraudulent deprivation of “property” belonging to “the citizens of 
West Virginia,” in addition to a deprivation of their intangible right to receive 
honest services in violation of the federal wire fraud statute.278  Yet, because 
 
272 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975). 
273 Id. at 542. 
274 Id. at 538-39 (quoting indictment). 
275 Id. at 545. 
276 Id. 
277 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). 
278 Id. at 943.  Although the Fourth Circuit’s wire fraud holding was based on an 
indictment that predicated the charge on the director’s “scheme to defraud the citizens of 
West Virginia of their right to his honest services” through trading on confidential 
information, the court cited with a cf. the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter for the 
proposition that “confidential information is ‘property,’ the deprivation of which can 
constitute wire fraud.”  Id. (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987)).  
The fact that the undisclosed misuse of nonpublic information constitutes a deprivation of a 
property right for purposes of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes is particularly 
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the Supreme Court in Carpenter had split on the validity of the 
misappropriation theory, the Fourth Circuit in Bryan was free to rule that Rule 
10b-5 insider trading liability could not be premised on the Director’s 
misappropriation of the nonpublic information concerning the lottery 
contracts.279  Today, however, in light of the Court’s subsequent decision in 
O’Hagan, there should be no question that a government official’s securities 
trading based on nonpublic state lottery information would violate Rule 10b-5.  
Indeed, such securities trading would defraud the public and the government of 
their right to the exclusive use of their property.280 
Thus, if a court were presented with Congressman B’s stock purchases in 
Company A, compelling precedents support the conclusion that his trading 
constitutes an undisclosed misappropriation of federal property which operates 
as a fraud and deceit on the United States and its citizens in violation of Rule 
10b-5.281  Like the Wall Street Journal and its owners, O’Hagan’s law firm and 
its client, and the state and citizens of West Virginia, the United States and its 
citizens would be deceived and defrauded in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities when a person entrusted with material nonpublic information 
feigns fidelity and exploits that information for his own personal profit.  What 
is key here is that material nonpublic information had been entrusted to 
Congressman B by the United States and its citizens, even if the information 
was not explicitly confidential pursuant to a statute, internal rule, or any other 
specific mandate.282  Nonpublic information about an imminent award of a 
 
important in light of the narrow construction which must now be accorded to § 1346’s 
protection of “the intangible right of honest services.”  See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (“[W]e now hold that [18 U.S.C.] § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-
and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.”); see supra notes 226-227.  Whether 
profits from trading on the basis of material nonpublic information could be viewed as 
improper kick-backs for purposes of Skilling’s honest-services holding is a question for 
another day. 
279 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943-44 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that while 
the misappropriation theory had been embraced by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, 
the Supreme Court was evenly divided in Carpenter and thus had yet to rule definitively 
whether the theory is “reconcilable with the language and purposes of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5”). 
280 Id. at 943; see also United States v. ReBrook, 842 F. Supp. 891, 894 (S.D. W. Va. 
1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995) (ruling on an appeal filed in a 
related prosecution involving an attorney who traded securities based on nonpublic lottery 
commission information). 
281 Congressman B’s subsequent disclosure of his stock purchases in Company A 
pursuant to Senate reporting rules would not serve to insulate him from Rule 10b-5 because 
O’Hagan would require disclosure prior to the trade, not after, see supra text accompanying 
note 69, and would require advance disclosure to all persons who are owed a duty of loyalty, 
see supra note 69. 
282 Much nonpublic congressional information is nevertheless designated explicitly as 
“confidential” pursuant to a host of statutes and congressional rules.  See George, supra note 
12, at 166-67. 
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defense contract by the Appropriations Committee does not belong to a 
member of Congress any more than nonpublic information about a lottery 
contract belongs to a state lottery director or nonpublic information about a 
corporation’s possible ore strike belongs to its officers and directors.283  As 
fiduciaries, they must hold that nonpublic information in trust for their 
principals.284 
b. The Federal Government as Employer 
Congressman B’s “undisclosed self-serving use” of the Appropriations 
Committee’s information to buy stock in Company A without prior disclosure 
of his intention to trade could likewise be viewed as a fraud on the federal 
government as his employer.  As previously discussed, an employer and 
employee stand in a “paradigmatic” fiduciary-like relationship whereby the 
employee obtains access to information “to serve the ends of” his employer 
and “becomes duty-bound not to appropriate the property for his own use.”285  
These principles account for why federal officials formerly with the FBI, the 
Federal Reserve, the Navy, and the Comptroller of the Currency (and/or their 
tippees) have all incurred liability for using nonpublic government information 
to profit personally from securities trading.286  Thus, assuming he can be 
deemed an employee of the federal government, Congressman B’s securities 
trading would constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5, even under the rather 
narrow parameters set out by the Second Circuit in Chestman.287 
 
283 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
284 Because this argument regards nonpublic government information as property 
belonging to the federal government and its citizens, it may hold particular appeal to those 
courts and scholars who justify the federal insider trading prohibition not on grounds of 
market integrity or investor confidence but rather on the protection of property rights in 
information.  See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he 
purpose of the misappropriation theory . . . is to protect property rights in information.”); 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576-78 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Winter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing scholarship by then-Professor Frank 
Easterbrook).  A principal criticism of this rationale has been that it extends Rule 10b-5 
protection to property owners in fiduciary relationships with the trader or tipper, even 
though the beneficiaries of that relationship are not the focus of federal regulation.  See, e.g., 
Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information – A Breach in Search of a 
Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 113 (1998) (“The easiest criticism of the property rights 
theory is that when Congress passed and subsequently amended the Exchange Act, it was 
concerned about fairness and the protection of investors, not the protection of property 
rights in information . . . .”).  Applying Rule 10b-5 to congressional insider trading is not 
susceptible to that criticism because the property owners (citizens) are also the principal 
parties protected by the anti-fraud prohibition (securities investors). 
285 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958)). 
286 See cases cited supra notes 100-103. 
287 See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. 
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Members of Congress receive paychecks from the federal government, so at 
least in that sense they would seem to qualify as federal employees.  Members 
of Congress have also been deemed employees of the federal government for 
the purposes of certain statutory protections or grants of immunity.288  On the 
other hand, several federal statutes draw distinctions “between members of 
Congress and its officers and employees.”289  Moreover, as one commentator 
observes, “there is a sense that members of Congress are not like employees 
because their public election gives them autonomy to make decisions as they 
see fit without being accountable to anyone but their constituency (and to that 
extent, only in subsequent elections).”290 
The inevitable handwringing that would occur over the question of whether 
members of Congress are employees of the federal government for purposes of 
the misappropriation theory is a function of the theory’s reliance on common 
law to establish the duty of disclosure on which the Rule 10b-5 violation is 
premised.  A loose analogy might be whether an independent contractor can be 
deemed an agent of the source of material nonpublic information, so that the 
contractor could be said to owe an inherent obligation of loyalty to his 
principal.291  Ultimately, however, employment status, like agency status, 
serves as a heuristic that allows courts to find a relationship of trust and 
confidence that triggers the disclosure obligation in Rule 10b-5 insider trading 
cases.  A court should find that members of Congress owe the United States 
 
288 See, e.g., Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 111 (1916) (holding that a member of 
the House of Representatives was an “officer of the government” within the meaning of a 
penal statute making it a crime to “falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or employee 
acting under the authority of the United States, or any Department, or any officer of the 
government thereof . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Operation Rescue Nat’l v. 
United States, 975 F. Supp. 92, 103 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that Senator Edward Kennedy 
was an employee of the federal government within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA) and was thus entitled to immunity for alleged acts of defamation performed in 
the course of his employment), aff’d, 147 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 1998).  The district court in 
Operation Rescue specifically noted that the FTCA was one of a number of federal statutes 
treating Senators and Representatives as “employees of the government” and concluded that 
while Senators and Representatives are “elected by the people,” they are “employed in the 
legislative branch and, therefore, fit within the literal definition of ‘employee of the 
government.’”  Id. 
289 Id.  Significantly, in its Code of Ethics for Government Service, Congress drew no 
such distinction.  See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH 
CONG., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 355 (Comm. Print 2008), available at 
http://ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf (stating that “it is the 
sense of Congress” that the Code “should be adhered to by all Government employees, 
including officeholders”). 
290 Jerke, supra note 12, at 1487.  But see supra notes 205-233 and accompanying text 
(discussing accountability through congressional self-discipline and Executive Branch 
prosecutions). 
291
 See SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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and its citizens a disclosure obligation whether or not a member of Congress is 
technically a federal employee. 
c. Trust Relationships with Fellow Members and Officials Outside of 
Congress 
In addition to the United States and its citizens, a member of Congress who 
uses nonpublic government information in securities trading without disclosing 
his intention to do so may deceive his fellow members (or other federal 
officials outside of Congress) who also entrusted him with that nonpublic 
information.  Because this theory would turn on the “reasonable and legitimate 
expectations” of the relevant parties, analysis would necessarily be ad hoc.292  
That is, as instructed by SEC Rule 10b-5(b)(2), a court would question whether 
the member of Congress and the source of the material nonpublic information 
“have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences” whereby the 
member knows, or reasonably should know, that the person communicating the 
information expects the recipient to maintain its confidentiality.293  If so, then 
that relationship provides yet another ground for liability under the 
misappropriation theory. 
Retuning again to Representative Slaughter’s example, Congressman B 
reasonably should know that the members of the Appropriations Committee 
expect him to maintain the confidentiality of nonpublic information pertaining 
to the imminent award of a defense contract.  Members of Congress and 
federal officials from other parts of the government (like the DOD) rely on 
each other’s loyalty and integrity, and these relationships routinely include 
“patterns and practices” of exchanging confidences.  Accordingly, the 
members of the Appropriations Committee (or an official at the DOD) would 
have a “reasonable and legitimate” expectation that nonpublic information 
about the imminent award of a defense contract would remain confidential and 
would not be used to enhance the profit in Congressman B’s securities 
portfolio.294  Thus, in the words of O’Hagan, they would be “dupe[d]” or 
“defraud[ed]”295 were Congressman B to purchase stock in Company A on the 
basis of this information without first disclosing his intention to do so. 
It is possible that Congressman B could contend that members of Congress 
implicitly condone, or at least tolerate, the use of nonpublic congressional 
 
292 See cases cited supra notes 88-95. 
293 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2) (2010). 
294 SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003); see George, supra note 12, at 
168-69 (“The unilateral decision by a Member or employee to release confidential 
information is inconsistent with the Senate’s practice of making such decisions openly and 
collectively.  Arrogation of this responsibility by individuals can destroy mutual trust among 
Members and be harmful to this institution” (quoting 138 CONG. REC. S17835, S17836 
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell))). 
295 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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information for personal profit in securities trading.  One certainly would hope 
that this contention would not prove true empirically, and that Congressman 
B’s stock purchases in Company A based on nonpublic information from the 
Appropriations Committee would instead draw scorn from other members of 
Congress who would regard such trading as unethical and outrageous.  But 
even in the unlikely event that such information were viewed by other 
members of Congress as an emolument of office, that view would only negate 
a finding of deception with respect to his fellow members.  It would not negate 
Congressman B’s deception of the United States and its citizens who have had 
their property misappropriated. 
d. Agreements Not to Use Confidential Information for Personal Gain 
Finally, even if a court were to disregard all of the aforementioned ways in 
which Congressman B could be found to be in a relationship of trust and 
confidence with the sources of the material nonpublic information pertaining to 
Company A, a court might still impute a disclosure duty under Rule 10b-5 
from the Code of Ethics for Government Service, which obligates all federal 
employees including officeholders to “[n]ever use any information coming to 
[them] confidentiality in the performance of governmental duties as a means 
for making private profit.”296  As the court maintained in SEC v. Cuban, even 
in the absence of a pre-existing fiduciary-like relationship with the source of 
material nonpublic information, a person can be held to an agreement “to 
refrain from trading on or otherwise using [information] for personal gain,”297 
and the “subsequent undisclosed use of [that] information for securities trading 
purposes” would constitute deception in violation of Rule 10b-5.298  The fact 
that the Code is “not a law under which a Member or staffer can be 
prosecuted”299 is irrelevant.  Indeed, were a court to accept this agreement-not-
to-use theory, Congressman B would not be prosecuted for violating the Code 
of Ethics.  Rather, he would be prosecuted for violating Rule 10b-5 and the 
Code would be used as evidence of his agreement “to refrain from trading on 
or otherwise using”300 congressional information for personal gain.301 
 
296 Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. 
B12 (1958). 
297 SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
298 Id. 
299 Slaughter Fact Check, supra note 150 (“[The Code] is a House Rule, enforceable only 
by the House Ethics Committee on an internal basis . . . .”). 
300 Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
301 See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding 
certain counts of an indictment charging congressman with mail and wire fraud, 
notwithstanding the fact that “[a]t trial, the Government will almost certainly rely upon 
House Rules in its effort to prove the statutory violations it has alleged”); United States v. 
Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The defendant clearly was tried not for 
violating the internal rules of the House of Representatives but for violating the mail fraud 
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Congressman B could raise several arguments in defense.  First, he could 
argue that his obligations under the Code do not amount to an agreement “to 
refrain from trading” within the meaning of Cuban.  He could also argue that 
the Cuban decision is an outlier, and that the district court’s reasoning does not 
comport with the fiduciary principles essential to the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in prior insider trading cases.302  Finally, he could argue that basing a 
Rule 10b-5 action on his alleged promise not to use the information would 
involve issues rendered non-justiciable by the Constitution’s Rulemaking 
Clause,303 because that Code provision is “too vague for judicial 
interpretation.”304  A court would then have to decide whether the Code is 
“ambiguous” or if it instead provides “judicially discoverable and manageable” 
standards for interpretation.305  The answer to that question is hardly self-
evident. 
B. Education as an Effective SEC Enforcement Tool 
A federal court may not be inclined to agree with each and every one of the 
above arguments under the classical and misappropriation theories of insider 
trading liability.  But given the tremendously broad range of precedents, and 
the expansive view of the duty of trust and confidence that has become the 
norm in insider trading cases, if the SEC were to prosecute Congressman B for 
violating Rule 10b-5, the SEC would almost certainly be able to establish that 
multiple persons were deceived and defrauded in connection with his stock 
purchases in Company A, regardless of whether he obtained the nonpublic 
defense contract information from the Appropriations Committee or an official 
at the DOD.  The same would be true if Congressman B purchased stock (or 
options) in Companies X, Y, and Z based on anticipated changes in the tax law 
or any other market-moving information that the SEC could prove was both 
material and nonpublic at the time of his trading.  Given that Rule 10b-5 
imposes on other government officials (as well as on attorneys, family 
members, electricians, roundtable members, creditors committee members, 
political consultants, and, of course, corporate insiders) an obligation to refrain 
from using material nonpublic information in their securities transactions,306 
surely it is not unreasonable to hold members of Congress to the same federal 
 
and false statement statutes.”). 
302 See supra notes 121-122. 
303 See supra notes 178-179. 
304 Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1306. 
305 Id. (“[J]udicial interpretation of an ambiguous House Rule runs the risk of the court 
intruding into the sphere of influence reserved to the legislative branch under the 
Constitution.  If a particular House Rule is sufficiently clear that we can be confident in our 
interpretation, however, then that risk is acceptably low and preferable to the alternative risk 
that an ordinary crime will escape the reach of the law merely because the malefactor holds 
legislative office.” (citation omitted)). 
306 See cases cited supra notes 88-95. 
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prohibition in an SEC prosecution.  Indeed, insider trading defendants 
routinely are held criminally liable under Rule 10b-5 despite the rule of lenity 
which requires strict construction of criminal statutes.307 
There should be little doubt that a single SEC Rule 10b-5 complaint filed 
against Congressman B for insider trading would “scare straight” other 
members of Congress or legislative staffers who may be operating under the 
misimpression that current law does not extend to securities trading on the 
basis of nonpublic congressional information.308  But rather than clarifying the 
law through a targeted enforcement action, it would be far better for the SEC to 
first state unequivocally that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition against insider trading 
applies to congressional knowledge in the same manner that it applies to other 
market-moving information that is both material and nonpublic.  Given the 
claims circulating the media and blogosphere (not to mention in the halls of the 
Capitol), the SEC should be aggressively seeking to refute the congressional 
 
307 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority’s fraud-on-the-source misappropriation theory 
because under the “rule of lenity,” section 10(b)’s “unelaborated statutory language . . . must 
be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction”); 
see Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory 
Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1035 
(“[T]he rule of lenity . . . requires strict construction of statutory ambiguities in order to 
avoid subjecting criminal defendants to surprise.”). 
308 Some commentators have even suggested that the publicity generated by the 2004 
study on Senate trading profits, Ziobrowski et al., supra note 5, may have “scared straight 
some Capitol Hill types.”  John Carney, Has Congress Been Scared Straight on Insider 
Trading?, CNBC (Oct. 12, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39634284/Has_ 
Congress_Been_Scared_Straight_On_Insider_Trading.  After his study was published, 
Professor Ziobrowski heard from other researchers who reported that members of Congress 
were no longer consistently outperforming other investors in the market in the years 
following his study.  Id.  He also observed that it is now much easier to track stock holdings 
of and trading by members of Congress because groups such as the Center for Responsive 
Politics have searchable databases of lawmakers’ financial disclosures.  Id.  Furthermore, 
members of Congress may now be more likely to place their investment assets in blind 
trusts.  See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21656, THE USE OF BLIND TRUSTS 
FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS 1 (2005) (describing a blind trust as “a device employed by a 
federal official to hold, administer and manage the private financial assets, investments and 
ownerships of the official, and his or her spouse and dependant children, as a method of 
conflict of interest avoidance”).   Members of Congress may also be wary about the 
possibility of private securities litigation.  Section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
78t-1 (2006), provides contemporaneous traders with an express right of action against any 
person who violates any provision of the Exchange Act “by purchasing or selling any 
security while in possession of material, nonpublic information.”  Id.  Private plaintiffs 
suing under section 20A need not prove that the defendant owed them a duty of disclosure; 
rather, to recover a defendant’s illegal gain from insider trading, plaintiffs need only to 
plead and prove a predicate violation of the Exchange Act, such as a violation of Rule 10b-
5.  See FERRARA, ET AL., supra note 43, at § 3.02. 
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immunity mantra and should be counseling the sponsors of the STOCK Act as 
to Rule 10b-5’s exceedingly broad scope.  A series of speeches or statements 
to the press would be important first steps toward changing practices in 
Congress that may have become entrenched but that nonetheless undermine the 
integrity not only of securities markets but also of government itself.  In view 
of the constitutional and other obstacles that the SEC could encounter while 
investigating congressional insider trading, education, rather than prosecution, 
may well be the SEC’s most effective enforcement tool. 
C. Legislative Staffers and Other Congressional Employees 
Like Congressman B’s securities trading based on nonpublic information 
about a defense contract, insider trading by a legislative staffer – or any other 
congressional employee – would violate Rule 10b-5 pursuant to both the 
classical theory and the misappropriation theory.  These individuals work for 
the members of Congress who were elected to serve the public as Senators and 
Representatives, and their disclosure obligations under Rule 10b-5 are thus 
both derivative and direct.  As agents for public fiduciaries, legislative staffers 
and other employees of Congress owe the general public (some of whom are 
investors trading contemporaneously) the same disclosure duties that are owed 
by the members or congressional committees who employ them, and their 
failure to disclose material nonpublic facts in a securities transaction would 
violate Rule 10b-5 under the classical theory.309  These employees also stand in 
a direct fiduciary-like relationship with one or more members of Congress and 
their “undisclosed, self-serving use”310 of their employer’s information would 
violate Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory as well.311  As discussed 
above, even scholars who have questioned the reach of existing law to 
members of Congress are quick to conclude that legislative staffers and other 
congressional employees would be liable under Rule 10b-5 based on the well-
established employer-employee misappropriation theory precedents.312 
D. Nonpublic Congressional Information Conveyed Through Tipping 
Given the size and the complexity of the so-called “political intelligence” 
industry in the United States,313 how the foregoing discussion relates to the 
 
309 See supra Part III.A. 
310 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
311 See supra Part III.A-B. 
312 See Bainbridge, Beltway I, supra note 12, at 294-95 (“[T]he relationship between the 
government and one of its employees is such that the undisclosed use by the latter of 
information gained in the course of his employment would give rise to liability under the 
misappropriation theory . . . . [and the] employment relationship should suffice for 
Congressional staffers to be deemed to have an agency or other relationship of trust and 
confidence with their employing agency.”); Lambert, supra note 12. 
313 For extensive analysis of what has become known as the “political intelligence 
industry,” see Jerke, supra note 12, at 1510-19 (seeking to curb the use of “political 
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topic of tipping merits an entire article all on its own.  For present purposes, 
though, we can look to the Court’s express statements in Dirks that a “tippee’s 
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative”314 and that a tippee’s disclosure 
obligation under Rule 10b-5 arises “from his role as a participant after the fact 
in the [tipper’s] breach of a fiduciary duty.”315  Thus, to establish Rule 10b-5 
liability on the part of a congressional official for tipping material nonpublic 
information (as opposed to trading on that information himself), the SEC 
would have to show that the official breached a fiduciary-like duty for some 
“direct or indirect personal benefit . . . such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit” or that the official intended to make “a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or a friend.”316  Moreover, even if the SEC 
could establish such a breach on the part of the congressional official, his 
tippee would be liable under Rule 10b-5 only if the SEC could prove that the 
tippee knew, or should have known, that there had been a breach.317 
Congressional officials may have a host of reasons for sharing material 
nonpublic information with others outside Congress.318  But under the 
framework set out by the Court in Dirks, Rule 10b-5 liability for illegal tipping 
and trading would be entirely dependent on the congressional official’s 
motivation for sharing such information.  Dirks’s “personal benefit” 
requirement would thus constitute a hurdle in any insider trading case where 
nonpublic congressional information is alleged to have been used.  But just as 
that hurdle is cleared routinely in tipper-tippee cases outside of Congress 
(including in several cases involving tips by federal officials),319 that hurdle 
could be overcome in cases involving tips by members of Congress, legislative 
staffers, and other congressional employees where nonpublic congressional 
information was conveyed in exchange for a personal benefit.320 
 
intelligence” through changes in congressional ethics rules rather than through an expanded 
application of Rule 10b-5). 
314 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
315 Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12). 
316 Id. at 663-64.  Although some courts disagree, the predominant view is that Dirks’s 
personal benefit requirement applies in both classical and misappropriation theory cases.  
See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 43, at 2-74. 
317 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
318 See PAINTER, supra note 12, at 167-70 (observing that campaign fundraisers, social 
events, and official briefings of industry groups are all “venues where government officials 
can be pumped for nonpublic information” and suggesting that elected officials who share 
such information may be “behaving very similarly to a tipper who, in return for payment, 
leaks misappropriated information to a tippee”). 
319 See cases cited supra notes 100-103. 
320 See PAINTER, supra note 12, at 170 & n.246 (suggesting that, in some circumstances, 
campaign contributions could be viewed as a personal benefit to elected officials within the 
meaning of Dirks).  Of course, in the corporate context, Dirks’s personal benefit 
requirement often prevented the SEC from pursuing Rule 10b-5 actions against persons who 
had traded securities on the basis of so-called “selective disclosures” that were arguably 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress, the SEC, and the Supreme Court all share in the view that the 
federal securities laws prohibit the offense of insider trading to promote market 
integrity and to foster investor confidence in the capital markets.  Insider 
trading on the basis of nonpublic congressional knowledge undermines these 
important objectives while simultaneously compromising the public’s trust and 
confidence in the government itself. 
The conventional wisdom that “it is perfectly legal to profit from 
information obtained within the Congress,”321 and that members of Congress 
and legislative staffers are “immune from insider-trading laws”322 is thus 
highly problematic.  Not only are such statements inaccurate, but they also fuel 
a troubling public perception that congressional officials are taking advantage 
of their positions to the public’s own detriment and that the SEC is utterly 
helpless to prevent it.  The SEC should be doing more to refute both the flawed 
legal claims and the public’s misperceptions. 
The issue of congressional insider trading can serve as a broader object 
lesson for why the federal securities laws should contain an explicit definition 
and prohibition of insider trading.  But the STOCK Act addresses only a slice 
of the much larger problem and, ironically, its enactment would likely narrow 
the general law under Rule 10b-5 that would otherwise apply to insider trading 
by congressional officials in the absence of a new statute.  Unless and until 
Congress acts to change the law more generally, the classical and 
misappropriation theories – with their emphasis on duties of entrustment – can 
function as well for congressional officials as they do for everyone else who 
trades securities in the capital markets. 
 
motivated by a corporate purpose.  See NAGY ET AL., supra note 130, at 491-92, 552.  
Securities analysts and other investment professionals, however, now operate in the wake of 
Regulation FD, which effectively prohibits public companies and their insiders from 
selectively disclosing material information to persons who are likely to trade on it, if the 
information has not been shared with the general public.  See SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 243.100(a)-(b)(1) (2010).  A Regulation FD analogue for elected officials is an intriguing 
possibility that warrants further consideration.  See PAINTER, supra note 12, at 171 (positing 
a “Regulation FD for government” but contending that it “would be difficult to design and 
implement”). 
321 Baird March 2006 Press Release, supra note 148. 
322 McGinty & Mullins, supra note 9. 
